A decentralised and context-aware trust management scheme for resource-constrained emergency communications. by Asuquo, Philip Michael
A Decentralised and Context-Aware
Trust Management Scheme for
Resource-Constrained Emergency
Communications
Philip Asuquo
Submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
from the
University of Surrey
Institute for Communication Systems
Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences
University of Surrey
Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, U.K.
May 2018
c© Philip Asuquo 2018

Declaration
I hereby declare that this thesis has been genuinely carried out by me and has not
been used in any previous application for a degree. The invaluable participation
of others has been duly acknowledged where appropriate.
Philip Asuquo
iii
Abstract
Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) provides connectivity where there is uncertainty
in end-to-end connectivity. In DTN, nodes exchange buffered messages upon an
encounter. In disaster operations where the telecommunication and power infras-
tructures are completely broken down or destroyed, DTN can be used to support
emergency communication till these infrastructures are restored. Security in DTN
remains a major challenge because of its network characteristics such as frequent
disruptions, dynamic topology, limited and constrained resources. One of the
major threats in DTN is Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. This attack mainly
comes from intermediary nodes that drop or flood packets in the network which
often results in the degradation of the network performance. This thesis proposes
strategies for mitigating routing misbehaviour in emergency communications us-
ing DTN. This thesis proposes three innovative contributions as follows.
A Collaborative Content-aware Trust Management Scheme (CCTMS) is proposed
for secure routing optimisation. CCTMS incorporates structural and content sim-
ilarities into the routing decision process. A trust model is developed based on
direct and indirect interactions between nodes using Beta distribution model,
which is used to evaluate the forwarding behaviour of encountered nodes. To
optimise the routing decision, the recurrence in mobility pattern of the nodes are
also exploited to form transitive similarity. The logical properties of the contents
generated by the mobile nodes are also exploited to form content similarity. How-
ever, since CCTMS still incurs a high overhead and significant delay, a Distributed
Trust Management Scheme (DTMS) is proposed. Energy trust is integrated into
the direct trust computation model as a trust metric and inter-contact graph is in-
troduced for the computation of transitive similarity. In DTMS, the inter-contact
graph is formed by the encounter between two nodes where each vertex represents
an encounter between two nodes. The novelty of the inter-contact graph is the
capturing of the latency distributions for each encounter between nodes. Finally,
the limitation in resource constrained networks is taken into consideration and
energy is identified as a vital resource to ensure availability of communication
in a resource constrained networks. An Energy-efficient Semi-distributed Trust
Management Scheme (ESTMS) is proposed for resource constrained emergency
response networks. ESTMS assumes that trusted entities are available at each
emergency response centre and are responsible for computing and filtering rec-
ommendations. Although ESTMS increases the delivery ratio and significantly
reduces the overhead ratio, it has a higher delay when compared to CCTMS and
DTMS. Extensive simulations and validations show that the proposed schemes
outperform existing routing and trust management protocols in the presence of
malicious nodes and are resilient to trust related attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, several protocols have been proposed to cope with the challenges
of intermittent connectivity. One of such is Delay/Disruption Tolerant Network-
ing (DTN) proposed by the interplanetary research group [1]. DTN is described as
an overlay architecture which sits on diverse regional networks, such as Mobile Ad
hoc Network (MANET), Satellite Network and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN).
In the networking research community, DTN is deployed in extreme environments
such as disaster recovery, wildlife, battlefield and other scenarios with sporadic
connectivity where there is no guarantee of end-to-end connection. Existing in-
frastructure in many cases are destroyed in the event of a disaster or overloaded
as a result of heavy usage. DTN is very appropriate for emergency scenarios
because it is infrastructure-less and messages are carried and forwarded by the
sender through intermediary nodes till it reaches the destination [2]. To conduct
search and rescue operations, communication is essential in disaster recovery to
reduce the damage and injury to lives and property. Communication is vital in
disaster recovery as various types of information must be disseminated across
the affected area. To coordinate disaster rescue and relief operations, the rescue
workers must have reliable information to manage the supply of relief materials
to the victims, coordinate relocation efforts and the dissemination of situational
1
2awareness information.
In emergency scenarios, several applications [3, 4, 5, 6] have been developed for
rescue and relief operations. In ARTEMIS [3], sensors are used to provide emer-
gency management information and automated remote triage. Agents are used
in the transmission of triage information using wireless ad hoc networks through
a reliable messaging layer. The authors in [4] developed a mobile agent electronic
triage tag system. This system stores and carries triage information about the
victims using mobile agents. These mobile agents are formed by mobile devices
that do not require end-to-end connectivity. The forwarding decision is based
on Time To Return (TTR) technique. For example, during the Kenyan election
in 2008 where an electoral violence erupted, a web application was developed to
facilitate communication between local media in remote areas and the interna-
tional community. This platform allowed Kenyans to send more accurate reports
on the electoral crisis [7]. In battlefield networks, the authors in [5] proposed a
Tactical Medical Coordination System (TacMedCS). This is used to capture and
display real time casualty data in battlefield and the casualty data is stored with
its GPS coordinates and sent through a satellite medium. Mesh communication
is established using IEEE 802.11 to enable collaboration between nodes. In [6],
the authors proposed a system that uses mobile devices for the creation of elec-
tronic triage tags. The electronic tags are transmitted opportunistically without
a direct communication with the receiver using wireless communication.
Furthermore, nodes are dependent on each other for successful data forwarding.
It is possible that a message relayed is dropped by a malicious or compromised
intermediary hop. Packet dropping attack poses a big security threat in DTN.
Packet dropping attack is classified as a Denial of Service (DoS) attack where
malicious or compromised node drop a fraction or all the messages relayed to
them. In an emergency communication network using DTN, this attack degrades
the performance of the network. It is quite challenging to deal with such rout-
3ing misbehaviours in DTN as certain conditions such as bandwidth and energy
lead to the wrong prediction of a node’s behaviour [8], [9], [10]. A node may
run out of energy or may be physically damaged and may be assumed to be
exhibiting routing misbehaviour. Some of the other impacts of dropping mis-
behaviour include, an increase in the network latency and overhead as well as
packet retransmissions. Besides packet dropping attacks, DTN is vulnerable to
packet flooding attacks [11], [12], [13],[14], [15], [16], [17], wormhole attacks [18],
[19] and selfish misbehaviours [20]. Due to its unique characteristics, traditional
cryptographic approaches proposed for wireless network such as Public Key In-
frastructure (PKI) [21] or Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) [22] are difficult to
implement in DTN as there is no guaranteed end-to-end connectivity or trusted
third parties to manage certificates. In DTN, nodes rely on pairwise encounters
to compute the contact probability of an encountered node. In a similar context,
the direct observations of an encountered node are used alongside recommenda-
tions from neighbouring nodes to formulate trust relationship between nodes. A
major challenge in the formulation of trust relationships is providing accurate
trust assessment especially when there are compromised nodes and the degree of
uncertainty in the network keeps increasing.
This thesis investigates the availability of DTN under Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks for emergency communication. The DoS attack aims at degrading the
network and disrupting service availability. It is assumed that responder nodes
are compromised to perform insider attacks. These type of attacks are very
difficult to detect with traditional cryptographic techniques due to the lack of
trusted entities in the network. An in-depth study of DoS attack is carried out
and existing mitigation schemes investigated. This thesis presents decentralised
trust management protocols for the protection of DTN against packet dropping,
colluding and collaborative attacks.
1.1. Motivation 4
1.1 Motivation
This research is motivated by three important factors which have not been ade-
quately addressed in literature; context-awareness, quality of service and event-
driven/ situational awareness. In literature, several schemes form trust relation-
ship based on the forwarding behaviour of a node. In event-driven scenarios,
evaluating the forwarding behaviour of a node alone may fail to provide a re-
liable and routing path for sending a message to the destination node due to
the dynamic nature of DTN. This research aims to design and validate a decen-
tralised and content-aware trust management scheme for mobility-aware DTN.
The objectives of this thesis are presented as follows:
• A comprehensive study of DTN, its characteristics and routing schemes.
• Study and implement the different types of attack in DTN and the available
mitigation schemes proposed in literature. Attention is paid focused on
mitigation schemes that detect packet dropping attacks.
• Study the mobility models available for disaster response networks, while
paying attention to ETSI reference scenarios for emergency communication
[23] and the recommended models under Information-Centric Networking
Baseline Scenarios for disaster recovery and relief operations RFC-7476 [24].
• To design and implement trust management techniques for the evaluation
of the behaviour of nodes. The proposed schemes should be able to forward
messages even when the number of misbehaving nodes become high.
• To develop a lightweight scheme that will not incur additional overhead
which will degrade the network performance. Establishing trust relationship
between nodes implies an extra cost to the nodes in terms of additional
computation and storage. Since DTNs are resource-constrained with limited
1.2. Contributions 5
buffer size, these additional overheads will result in the dropping of messages
when the nodes’ buffer are full thereby degrading the network performance.
• To develop schemes with high probability of detecting and discarding ma-
licious and comprised nodes while keeping collusion to a minimum.
• To implement schemes that improve the network performance, computa-
tional and communication cost in terms of delivery ratio, average latency,
overhead ratio and detection accuracy.
• To develop an energy efficient scheme for emergency communications, this
scheme must take into consideration DTN as a resource-constrained net-
work.
1.2 Contributions
This research is aimed at addressing routing misbehaviour in disaster response
networks using DTN. The overarching contribution in this thesis is the design,
implementation and validation of decentralised and context-aware trust manage-
ment scheme, which provides a reliable assessment of the behaviour of nodes when
there are malicious entities. Having thoroughly investigated the objectives pro-
vided in the previous section, the major contributions of this thesis are presented:
• A collaborative content-aware trust management scheme is proposed for
data forwarding in DTN. This scheme combines the communication trust
and similarity trust to evaluate the trustworthiness of an encountered node.
The data trust is computed based on the forwarding behaviour of an en-
countered node, while similarity trust is computed in two folds (transitive
and content similarity). In transitive similarity, each node exploits the
recurrence in mobility patten to form Points of Interest (PoIs) from the
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encounter graphs while content similarity exploits the similarities in en-
counter records such as node’s designated centre, frequently encountered
node’s group and centre, Transitive and content similarity are computed
using Jaccard’s similarity index while data trust is computed using Beta
distribution.
• A decentralised trust management scheme is proposed for data forwarding
in emergency communication using DTN. Different from the previous ap-
proach, this approach incorporates energy as a trust metric to evaluate the
forwarding behaviour of node. In the previous approach, the POIs were
computed from the encounter graph. In this approach, the POIs are com-
puted based on the inter-contact times to compute pairwise inter-contact
delay. This incorporates QoS into the emergency communication network.
In addition to trust similarity, energy trust is incorporated into the trust
assessment to evaluate the forwarding behaviour of a node while the inter-
contact time is used to optimise the routing path.
• For resource constrained emergency communication networks, an energy-
efficient semi-distributed trust management scheme is proposed. In this
approach, it is assumed that each designated centre participating in disas-
ter recovery operation has a trusted authority. To reduce computational
overhead and reduce energy consumption, the trusted authorities are used
to manage recommendation requests and filtering while direct trust is com-
puted upon an encounter with another node.
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1.4 Organisation of Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview
of Delay Tolerant Network and its application areas. A brief description of the
routing protocols in DTN is discussed. An overview of DTN for emergency com-
munication is presented and further details on the modelling reference scenarios
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are provided. In the last section, security in DTN is presented and the various
approaches proposed to mitigate routing misbehaviours in DTN. In Chapter 3,
the concept of trust is presented with some background information on trust and
reputation. Trust management approaches are presented in different networks
including P2P, MANET, WSN, IoT and DTN. In Chapter 4, a collaborative
trust management scheme is proposed for emergency communications. In Chap-
ter 4, the trust computation is based on communication trust and similarity trust.
Chapter 5 presents a distributed trust management scheme for emergency com-
munications. In addition, it incorporates energy as a trust metric into the trust
component in addition to the QoS provided by transitive trust component. In
Chapter 6, an energy-efficient trust management scheme is proposed. In this
scheme, it is assumed that each centre has a trusted authority to manage recom-
mendation filtering. Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the main contribution of this
thesis and points out some future directions.
Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1 An Overview of Delay Tolerant Network
Networks that enable communication where no end-to-end connectivity is guar-
anteed are often referred to as Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) [25]. This type
of network is usually characterized by high latencies, variable delays as well as
high error rate [1]. The Inter-Planetary Networking Special Interest Group (IPN-
SIG) launched a project in 1998 with the aim of establishing connection between
nodes in different planets. These deep space communications were characterized
by frequent disruptions and high propagation delays. The IPNSIG later identified
the Inter-Planetary Network (IPN) as a special scenario of Intermittently Con-
nected Networks (ICNs) [25]. A network device with a bundle layer which acts
as a source, an intermediary or a message destination is regarded as a DTN node
[26]. Some networks with these characteristics include, Exotic Media Networks
(EMN) which involves satellites using high Radio Frequency (RF) transceivers,
Sensor/Actuator Networks (SAN) deployed in underwater areas, Mobile Ad hoc
Networks (MANET) an infrastructure less network that is self-configuring, Vehic-
ular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) using cars as mobile nodes to create a network
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and Battle Field Wireless Military Network (BWMN) wireless military networks
for tactical war-fare [27]. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, there are numerous chal-
lenged networks which are classified as ICNs. DTN uses a store and forward
switching mechanism to tackle the problem of intermittent connectivity, variable
long delays. The DTN architecture is implemented by creating an overlay on the
OSI model between the transport and application layer as shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.1: Intermittently Connected Networks
Figure 2.2: Bundle Placement within the OSI model
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2.2 DTN Applications
DTN has continuously drawn the attention of researchers and the industry due
to its wide range of applications. Some application areas are discussed below:
2.2.1 Interplanetary Networks (IPNs)
The concept of DTN was developed initially for interplanetary networking [28].
IPN was proposed to support terrestrial and interplanetary links. However, since
the internet protocols were not suitable for this purpose, a DTN architecture
was proposed for IPNSs. The Bundle Protocol (BP) which was developed by
the Internet Research Task Force for IPNs was first demonstrated from space as
bundle convergence layer by the authors in [29]. In the last decade, a series of
projects focusing on explorations in Mars have been carried out by NASA and
other agencies. One of which is the Cisco router in Low Earth Orbit (CLEO)
which was launched into space to monitor disasters in UK [30].
2.2.2 Surveillance Application
Underwater networks are characterised by their node density and spatial cover-
age. These characteristics have a major impact on the Media Access Control
(MAC). The authors in [31] point out that DTN has not radio-based terrestrial
networks, the DTN framework perfectly fits into underwater networks as pro-
tocols designed for radio frequency wireless networks and traditional networks
perform poorly in underwater environments. In their extensive survey, they show
that underwater networks use the concept of DTN to replicate packets for transfer
epidemically during frequent disruptions. DTN has been widely used in underwa-
ter acoustic networks because of its adaptability and non-reliance on the network
for configuration messages [32]
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2.2.3 Wildlife Tracking
DTN has been used to support the tracking of wildlife (ZebraNet)[33]. At Mpala
Research Centre, a collaborative research was carried out between biologist and
computer scientist to track the movement pattern of zebra. In [34], DTN is used
in the sampling of the current status of tail white deer. A DTN technique was
used to obtain a maximum achievable monitoring range using the least amount
of wireless sensors.
2.2.4 Disaster Response Network
DTN has been used to handle infrastructural issues during emergency response
such as earthquakes [35]. With the breakdown of communication infrastruc-
ture and power which often last for days, DTN was used for emergency com-
munications due to its resilience and infrastructure independence [36]. Recently,
DTN was deployed in the North Indian flooding and the Tohoku earthquake
and tsunami which occurred in 2011 in Japan [37]. A popular approach (Post-
Disaster Mobility model(PDM))[38] which mimics the aftermath of disaster has
been used extensively for evaluation of DTN in disaster scenarios. This model has
been adopted by IETF for Information-Centric Networking (RFC 7476) baseline
scenarios on recovery and emergency operations [24].
2.2.5 Tactical Warfare Networks
In network-centric battlefield, self-organising networks play a vital role in the
operation of mobile units deployed to meet tactical demands. Several tactical
networks exhibit frequent disconnections which often impair or halt IP traffic.
DTN has been well studied for tactical networks and found suitable for this sce-
nario [39]. In [40], a DTN architecture was designed to support a Software De-
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fined Battle-Field Network (SDBN) which is composed of several communication
technologies interconnected by multiple satellites.
2.2.6 Vehicular Networks
Vehicular Delay Tolerant Network (VDTN) has emerged as DTN-based architec-
ture assumes that the data and control plane are separated thereby introducing
an IP over VDTN. Signalling information and resource allocation are handled by
the control plane while the data plane is used for the transmission of data bundles
between nodes [41]. In VDTN, fixed nodes are placed along the roads in order
to relay messages. Some important application of this architecture include the
notification of traffic conditions, weather conditions and advertisements such as
free parking spots [42].
2.2.7 Rural Communication
In developing countries, DTN has been used to support rural kiosks operation
[43]. DTN assisted kiosks in rural areas to provide a wide range of services
including birth, marriage and death certificates, elections, bill collections emails
and land records etc. The use of dial-ups, VSAT or long range WiFi technologies
are very expensive and prone to failure in these environments. An example is the
Daknet project [44] which was successfully deployed in India and Cambodia at
lower cost when compared to the traditional land-line solutions.
2.2.8 Opportunistic Content Sharing
In opportunistic content sharing, mobile users create opportunistic links between
themselves in order to share contents of interest. An example is the sharing of
contents by people riding on an underground train [45]. These contents are stored
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on the phone and forwarded later. This scenario is often referred to as Pocket
Switched Networks (PSNs) where wireless contents are disseminated without the
reliance of an infrastructure [24].
2.3 Routing Protocols in DTN
Routing in DTN is more burdensome when compared to MANETs due to the
frequent topology changes it exhibits. In DTN, routing is achieved by persis-
tently storing the message at the intermediary nodes as no end-to-end paths
may never exist. Several routing schemes have been proposed in literature [46],
[47]. These schemes are classified based on their message control and forwarding
strategy. Routing protocols in DTN is grouped into three categories: unicast,
multicast and broadcast routing. In unicast routing, each message is delivered to
a unique destination. Naive replication, hybrid and utility forwarding approaches
are the three basic families of unicast routing. Naive replication approach such as
flooding-based routing relies on message replication to achieve a delivery proba-
bility that is sufficient. Utility forwarding approach such as encounter prediction
uses a utility metric to evaluate the quality of the encountered node in making
forwarding decisions [48]. The Hybrid schemes combine the attributes of the
flooding and utility metric to make routing decisions. An overview of the state
of the art routing protocols proposed for routing in DTN is discussed in the next
subsection.
2.3.1 Direct Delivery & First Contact
These are single copy routing protocols with only one copy of message in the
network [49]. In Direct Delivery routing, the source node keeps the message
intended to be delivered to the destination node in its buffer until it comes it
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contact with the destination node or at the expiry of the messages lifetime (TTL).
In First Contact routing, the source node forwards the message to the first node
it comes in contact with by random walk search while it deletes its own copy
of the message. This process is repeated till the destination node receives the
message.
2.3.2 Epidemic Routing
Epidemic routing is a flooding based DTN routing protocol which assumes that
each participating node in the network has an unlimited buffer size and bandwidth
with the assumption that a node stores all the messages that is received during
contact [50]. This routing scheme has been evaluated and considered as the
routing protocol with the highest delivery probability. However, the issue of
network degradation as a result of severe contention and high energy consumption
as a result of the multiple message replication still remains an open issue although
a lot of work has been done to improve Epidemic by prioritising messages using
Prioritised Epidemic Routing Protocol (PREP) [51].
2.3.3 Seek & Focus
The authors in [52] propose a single copy routing protocol (Seek & Focus) for
networks with intermittent connections. In this scheme, the source node randomly
forwards a single message then waits to encounter a node with a high utility.
When this is done, it switches to a utility based metric to relay the message to
the destination node. The utility concept demonstrates the efficiency of a node
in delivering a message to the destination node.
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2.3.4 Spray & Wait
A quota-based routing protocol (Spray & Wait) is presented by the authors in
[53]. In Spray & Wait, the source node sprays a predefined number of messages
(copies). The message with one remaining copy ticket is then delivered directly
to the destination node. Spray & Wait is an extended version of the two-hop
forwarding approached proposed by the authors in [54] for adhoc networks. Spray
& Wait has two versions, Binary Spray & Wait (BSW) and Source Spray & Wait
(SSW). Spray & Wait combines the agility of Epidemic alongside the easiness
and austerity of direct transmissions.
2.3.5 Encounter-Based Routing
The Encounter-Based Routing (EBR) is also a quota based routing protocol pro-
posed by the authors in [55]. EBR limits the numbers of messages replicated in
the system. EBR uses encounter average to predict future encounter rates. This
is computed when two nodes come in contact and exchange the relative ratio of
their encounter rates with other participating nodes. EBR maximises the message
delivery ratio and minimises the delay and overhead when a message is relayed
from the source node to the destination node.
2.3.6 RAPID
In [56], the authors propose a Resource Allocation Protocol for Intentional DTN
(RAPID) routing. This scheme is based on an administrator-specific routing
metric for the optimisation of the buffer space. In RAPID routing, the routing
metric is first translated to a per-packet utility to decide on allocation. At each
contact opportunity, a bandwidth resource is allocated to a set of messages in the
buffer of a rapid node. This is done to optimise the routing metric and messages
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are delivered through opportunistic replication until the destination node gets a
copy of the message.
2.3.7 PROPHET
In [57], a Probabilistic ROuting Protocol using History of Encounters and Transi-
tivity (PROPHET) is proposed for message forwarding in DTN. PROPHET uses
a utility metric which is based on the probability of encounters. PROPHET deals
with message congestion through transitivity. PROPHET has been widely used
in the evaluation of encounter-based trust routing schemes because of its ability
to estimate the likelihood of future encounters. Again PROPHET takes into ac-
count, the ageing factor to discard previous encounter records thereby optimising
the buffer space.
2.3.8 MaxProp
MaxProp is a routing protocol that takes into account the limited bandwidth and
buffer space in intermittently connected networks. MaxProp estimates the likeli-
hood of message delivery as well as the likelihood of route failure. Messages are
exchanged in a specific order of priority. Messages which have not transversed far
are given priority in the network. This is achieved by logically splitting the buffer
into two parts based on the hop-count with a pre-defined threshold. Messages
below the pre-defined threshold are sorted by hop-counts while the ones above
the threshold are sorted by a scoring mechanism [58].
2.3.9 SimBET
The concept of social networks has been used to diffuse messages to nodes of
interest in social networks [46]. Social relationship in DTN is formed based on
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the social similarity among nodes linked together. In [59], the authors propose
a data forwarding technique based on social network analysis. They define the
utility metric using similarity and betweenness. Social Similarity computes the
number of common neighbours between a node and its destination as the total
number of encounter opportunities that have elapsed. The betweenness of each
node is is defined as the ability to facilitate the interaction between nodes and
their links. Simbet prevents the forwarding of messages if the utility metrics of
the pairwise encounter between nodes are equal. Based on the works of [46], [60],
[61], DTN routing protocols proposed in literature are classified into unicasting,
multicasting and anycasting algorithms. Types of DTN routing algorithms along
with their characteristics and examples are shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Classification of DTN Routing Protocols
Types Characteristics Examples
Unicast Delivers message to its unique destination. Consist of
two basic families including Utility Forwarding and Nave
Replication where utility metric based on encountered
history is used to achieve an efficient forwarding and a
replication approach to achieve sufficient delivery using
multiple message copies
Direct Delivery, Epidemic, Spray and Wait,
First Contact, Seek and Focus, CAR, Sim-
Bet, Bubble, PeopleRank, PROPHET, Max-
Prop, HiBop, EBR, RAPID, Data Mule
Multicast Delivers message to a group of interested destinations STBR, DTBR, EMBR, GBR, SDM
Anycast Delivers message to any node, there is no predefined
destination node or group of nodes.
EMDDA, MDRA
2.4 DTN for Emergency Communication
To minimize property damage, injury and loss of life, situational awareness is
very important in the event of a disaster. As recently reported in the media [62],
Hurricane Irma which recently hit the Caribbean did not only destroy buildings
but also damaged 95 percent of the communication infrastructure on these islands.
Similar events have been witnessed in the Asia-Pacific region such as the Tohoku
earthquake and tsunami in Japan which occurred in 2011 [63].
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Disaster events often lead to power outages and the destruction of communi-
cation infrastructures. This situation affects the search and rescue operations.
Communications is very essential for situational awareness of the environment
and individuals affected by the disaster. In the recent years, there has been a
rapid increase in the number of devices with computational and communication
efficiency with a variety of provisions made for connectivity such as Bluetooth,
WiFi, WiMax, 3G, 4G and LTE. The use of Internet applications and services
are very useful when a disaster occurs. Nevertheless, these services may only be
available with limited capability or intermittently as a result of power outage of
infrastructure breakdown.
2.5 Disaster Modelling Reference Scenarios
In disaster situations, an additional emergency communication is often required
to enable the coordination of rescue operations. However, the non-availability of
disaster characteristics which provide user requirements based on realistic events
remains an open issue. A brief description of ETSI’s reference scenario [64] for
emergency communication and Information Centric Networking (ICN) baseline
scenario (RFC 7476) [65] for emergency support and disaster recovery are dis-
cussed below:
2.5.1 ETSI’s Emergency Reference Scenario
ETSI’s Technical committee for satellite earth stations and systems (TC-SES)
which consist of a group of experts from both ICT and disaster management
prepared reference scenarios for emergency communications during disasters. The
technical documentation covers two scenarios:
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1. Large Scale Disaster: The first reference model focuses on a large-scale dis-
aster. The use case is major earthquake in an urban environment. The
technical specification defines the Earthquake (EQ) scenario based on the
physical consequences and the main constituent events. The general de-
scription for the scenario considers an urban area hit with a magnitude,
which is sufficient to destroy buildings, disrupt infrastructures, cause power
outages, destroy telecommunication infrastructure etc. Figure 2.3 describes
the casualty flow chat used to describe the disaster recovery process from
the hazard area to the final evacuation points [66].
Figure 2.3: Mobility Model describing casualty flowchart in EQ Scenario
2. Small Scale Disaster: The small scale disaster considers a Mass Transporta-
tion Accident (MTA) as its use case. This scenario describes a train crash
from a collision with a vehicle at a level crossing which is located in sparsely
populated area. As shown in the geographical layout in Fig 2.4, the hazard
area has a dimension of 400m by 600m where A represents the rail track,
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B represents the road with level crossing, C represents the closest ambu-
lance station, D, E and F represent the fire station, shelter and hospital.
In the MTA scenario, the main consequences is the casualty incident which
requires efficiency in transport logistics and treatment of victims [23].
Figure 2.4: Mobility Model describing MTA Scenario
2.5.2 ICN Baseline Scenarios
The concept of DTN has been envisioned for ICNs since ICN do not rely on end-
to-end communication. ICN Baseline Scenarios RFC 7476 describes the use of
DTN in emergency scenarios. They point out that in these situations, it is typical
for the telecommunication infrastructure to be damaged. To address this, they
propose the use of DTN in disaster stricken areas to disseminate information. As
pointed out in ETSI’s reference scenario, ICN baseline scenario also points out
that commonly used traces have been adopted for disaster zones. However, three
synthetic models have been adopted for emergency support and disaster recovery.
These include:
1. The Post-Disaster Mobility Model (PDM) [Model 1]: The PDM model
mimics the events that occur after a natural disaster. Based on a given
city map, various role-based movements are described. The PDM models
has two sets of groups: the survivors and the responders that support the
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rescue and relief operations in the aftermath of a disaster. The authors again
clearly point out that it is difficult to directly validate the model against the
real instance of a disaster. Similar to the EQ scenario described in ETSI’s
technical specification, a set of centres take part in the recovery operation
including relief camps, medical centres and hospitals, evacuation centres,
police and fire station and the main coordination centres. The PDM model
captures the aftermath of a disaster with different mobility patterns such
as centre-to-centre movement, event-driven, convergence move and cyclic
route. These are the movement patterns undertaken by the agents that
take part in the recovery operation [38].
2. Model 2: The second model focuses on emergency responders using Ran-
dom Way Point (RWP) with attraction points and a more realistic traffic
modelling systems. This model is based on the evaluation of tactical issues
in civil protection. As illustrated in Figure 2.5, the disaster areas scenario
consist of disjunct sub-tactical areas which are classified based on their
functions. Similar to the ETSI model, we have the incident location, clear-
ing station for casualties, awaiting treatment area, ambulance point, and
the technical operation command. This scenario was developed based on a
large catastrophe manoeuvre which took place in 2005 at Cologne [67].
3. Model 3: The third model focuses on the video of sparse mobile ad-hoc
networks which in disaster environments. Here, the focus is on the delivery
of the video recorded in the hazard area to the intervention chief. As shown
in Figure 2.6, the intervention chief is normally positioned in a safe place
that is approximately hundreds of metres from the hazard area. When
multiple regions are affected, the same structure is used in each of the
regions. The Police, medical service and fire departments are deployed
between these regions. Nodes in mobile ad-hoc networks are considered as
part of the overlay network used in storing and relaying videos. Responders
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Figure 2.5: Mobility Model describing Model 2 Scenario
are dispatched for rescue operations from the point where the intervention
chief is located [68].
Figure 2.6: Mobility Model describing Model 3 Scenario
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2.6 Security in Delay Tolerant networks
The application of DTN is limited as a result of security and privacy issues as-
sociated with it. Just like other wireless networks, DTN has similar threats and
vulnerabilities [69]. The presence of malicious nodes in an emergency response
network using DTN poses serious threats to data dissemination in a post dis-
aster scenario. Challenged networks are vulnerable to Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability attacks, these attacks are launched in a DTN network includ-
ing packet dropping [70], [71], [8], [9], [10], [20], [72], bundle flooding [11], [12],
[13],[14], [15], [16],[17], wormhole attacks [18], [19]. Researchers have focused
more on improving routing schemes in DTN than making security provisions for
communications in disconnected networks. Traditional Mechanisms such as the
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Certificates Revocation List (CRL) are not
suitable for DTN as a result of its lack of infrastructure and intermittent con-
nectivity [17], [73]. Detection and mitigation schemes in other networks are not
applicable in DTN as a result of its unique characteristics. In MANET [61], [74],
[75], a secure routing is implemented whereas this is not possible in DTN as a
result of its opportunistic nature. A study carried out by [76] on the efficiency
of DTN without a security mechanism shows that DTN is highly vulnerable to
Denial of Service (DOS) attacks.
2.6.1 Classification of Attacks
1. Passive Attack An attack where the adversary attempts to learn the net-
work or obtain information without disturbing the normal network oper-
ation is a passive attack [77]. Passive attacks are in the form of eaves-
dropping and monitoring of transmission. It is difficult to detect passive
attacks because they do not alter the packets sent from the source node
to the destination node and there is no indication whether an adversary is
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eavesdropping or observing the traffic pattern of a network [78].
2. Active attacks Active attacks are considered as malicious activities that
disrupt the operation of a network by modifying, deleting, impersonating or
falsifying messages before it gets to the intended recipients [13]. Examples
of this type of attacks include modification, replay, denial of service and
masquerade attacks. These attacks pose serious threats in a DTN infras-
tructure [79]. Table II shows some examples of attacks on different layers.
Table 2.2: Attacks on Different Layers
Layer Types of Attacks
Application Repudiation
Bundle Eavesdrop ping, bundle sniffing, illicit copy
of data, TTL attacks, version change attacks,
authenticity attacks, bundle falsification
Transport Session hijacking attack, SYN flooding.
Network Wormhole, Blackhole, Grayhole, Sybil at-
tacks
Mulitlayer Packet flooding and Impersonation attacks.
2.6.2 Preventing Selfish Behaviours in DTN
Several schemes have been proposed to reduce the impact of non-forwarding nodes
on the routing performance. These schemes are classified into 3 categories [80],
[81]; Credit based, Barter based and Reputation based incentive schemes. These
approaches were first proposed for Multi-hop Wireless Networks (MWN) and
their analogies were drawn from the human society [82].
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2.6.2.1 Barter-Based Strategies
The Barter based approach is regarded a Tit-For-Tat approach or direct reci-
procity. This strategy implies that two encountering nodes must provide the
same services for each other. This bilateral agreement makes barter very easy
to implement. Long term information is disregarded by Barter based schemes
which makes the cost of implementation of barter minimal. Nevertheless, this
synchronous trading scheme is a fails when an activity and its benefit are not
simultaneous [82]. The authors in [80], [83] divide the messages into two cate-
gories which include the primary and the secondary messages. For two nodes to
establish connection, they must agree on which portion of their messages must be
downloaded to each other and the size of the fragments must be the same. The
communication is disrupted if one node has downloaded more number of messages
than the other. Exchanging the same amount of messages by two nodes has both
good and bad consequences, the routing performance is degraded dramatically
assuming two encounter nodes meet and there is no message in the buffer of one
node, message description is not exchanged which increases the delivery cost and
latency [60], [84].
2.6.2.2 Credit-Based Strategies
The credit based strategies stimulate the cooperation of nodes by utilizing the
concepts of virtual credits with originated from virtual currencies [82]. A node
that cooperates to forward a message to another node is given a certain amount
of credit as reward. The credit incentive scheme has two categories [85] including
Message Purse Model and Message Trade Model. In the Purse Model, the source
node pays credit to the relay nodes that participate in the hop-by-hop forwarding
of the message till it gets to the destination node. In the Message Trade Model
[86], the messages are regarded as very important good. The receiver node pays
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credit to the relay nodes that forward the message until the message reaches the
destination. The Message Purse Model assumes the existence of a Virtual Bank
or Credit Clearance Service (CCS). The main function of the virtual bank is to
charge the source node of the message and reward the relay nodes that participate
in the message forwarding till the message gets to the destination node [20]. A
secure social aware incentive scheme based on an identity cryptosystem [71] is
proposed to assure the security of nodes. Simulations results have shown that this
scheme improves cooperation and reduces malicious attacks aimed at dropping
packets in DTN. The Message Trade Model is susceptible to attacks because
the source node does not reward the intermediary nodes for relaying messages
and the source node might flood the network with malicious packets. However,
these models are not suitable when different routing protocols are considered.
The rewarding scheme in [87] was developed for single copy routing protocols
where a copy of the message exist in the routing process. The authors in [84]
point out that the routing performance of single-copy routing protocols (First
Contact and Direct Delivery) are too low to be applicable. In the multi-copy based
routing protocols [81], [88] where virtual currencies with credit rewarding schemes
are implemented, non-forwarding nodes can exhibit credit forgery attacks, layer
removal attacks and submission refusal attacks which are regarded as cheating
actions in virtual banking [20], [88]. However, the authors in [88] propose two
credit schemes based on game theory and security protocols. While the game
theory scheme [89], [90] uses its framework to investigate non-cooperative nodes,
the security protocol uses cryptographic tools to ensure the security of the credits
[91], [92]. Most of these schemes assume end-to-end connectivity which is not
suitable for DTN as a result of its frequent disruptions.
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2.6.2.3 Reputation-based Strategies
Several reputation-based approaches [96],[97], [95][87], [98] have been proposed
for mitigating and detecting selfish behaviours in DTN. Reputation schemes are
based on the experiences and previous observations. In selfish behaviour, the
reputation of a node is the trust value assigned to a node based on its forwarding
behaviour. Strategies for preventing selfish behaviour in DTN can be grouped
into two categories; detection-based and non-detection schemes.
In the detection based model, the behaviour of each intermediary node is mon-
itored by the evaluating node. [96], [97], [95]. A user-centric and social-aware
reputation based scheme is presented in [96], [94]. This reputation based scheme
relies on neighbouring nodes to keep track of the reputation of another node and
monitor traffic as well. MobiID is proposed to stimulate the cooperation of selfish
nodes using social properties to expedite the reputation establishment of MobiID
so that nodes in the same community can form a consensus by sharing their rep-
utation information. Reputation tickets are maintained in the buffer of the node
which allows the node to provide its reputation on demand. In a comparative
analysis with Epidemic, Spray & Wait and Prophet when there are malicious
nodes with selfish attributes, MobiID outperforms the compared schemes. In
[95], the source node and the intermediary nodes that relay messages keep their
contact history records which contains the message identifiers, timestamps and
the destination node. To detect cooperative and selfish nodes, when a node en-
counters another node, the evaluating node checks the forwarding records and
the received messages from the last time of encounter. In the non-detection ap-
proaches [98], [87], the authors in [98] periodically decrease the reputation of all
nodes that successfully deliver messages to the destination nodes. The approach
in [87] is similar to [98], the intermediary nodes are rewarded when the forward a
message successfully. This is a form of a credit incentive strategy. Once a proof
of collaboration is sent to the trusted authority, the cooperative nodes can get
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good reputation values.
2.6.3 Preventing Flooding Attacks in DTN
Nodes can launch flooding attacks for malicious or selfish reasons. DTN is sus-
ceptible to flooding attacks as a result of their limitation in buffer space and
bandwidth, malicious nodes can flood the network with many packets which can
degrade the network performance and prevent legitimate packets from reach-
ing their destination nodes [12]. With valid cryptographic credentials, flooding
attacks carried out by outside attackers can easily be detected using valid sig-
natures. When considering internal flooding attacks, authentication of packets
does not guarantee delivery to the destination nodes thus making bundle flood-
ing in DTN an open issue [99]. Very few techniques [99], [12], [13], [14],[100]
have been proposed to mitigate flooding attacks in DTN. In [99], a distributed
scheme is proposed which uses the rate limiting technique to determine if a node
has violated its limit using carry-claim-check detection strategy. This technique
uses the pigeon-hole principle to ensure that claims made by malicious nodes are
detected. Similarly, the authors in [15] propose an Intrusion Detection Scheme
(IDS) to monitor the network using the rate limit of each node. This technique
uses a self-analysis approach to detect the inconsistency of a node. In an attempt
to mitigate flooding attacks, a light-weight authentication scheme is proposed by
the authors in [13] to detect and isolate misbehaving nodes. This occurs when
there is a failed authentication after three trials, a misbehaviour alert bundle is
sent as a unicast message to the security-aware participating neighbour nodes
within the network. TFo alleviate flooding attacks, a queuing policy was formu-
lated for Probabilistic Routing Protocol using history of Encounters and Tran-
sitivity (PROPHET). Flooding attacks considered in this scenario were random
flooding, selective destination flooding and non-existent destination flooding. the
mitigation scheme proposed incorporates an alert when a node sends too many
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messages. The concept of fair allocation resource allocation is used which origi-
nated from [101]. The proposed scheme allocates memory for storage of messages
based on the number of encounters which means the nodes that encountered more
often have more storage space [14]. A reputation based routing protocol has been
proposed to alleviate flooding attack in DTN, this technique uses the reputation
of node when two nodes come in contact based on a predefined range. When a
node comes in contact with node another node that has a degree of trustworthi-
ness as a genuine forwarder within a predefined range, the other nodes that come
in contact with node evaluating will also be updated about the evaluated nodes
behaviour [100].
2.6.4 Preventing Wormhole Attacks in DTN
Wormhole attack was first introduced by [102] in wireless networks, these attacks
are recorded in one area of the network and replayed at another end by adversary
nodes [103]. In MANET and WSNs, wormhole attack was previously seen as a
type of routing misbehaviour [104]. Packets flowing through a wormhole are selec-
tively dropped or delayed by malicious nodes to degrade the network performance
of a wireless network. As these packets are re-routed and replayed in different
areas of the network, the security mechanism is not compromised which makes
detection difficult using cryptographic verification schemes. Several schemes in-
cluding statistical methods [105], timing analysis [102] and graphic based methods
[106] as detection techniques for wormhole attacks in MANET and WSNs. Miti-
gation schemes [107], [108], [109], [110], [111] have also been proposed using Fast
Fourier Transform (FFT) based approach and Passivity based approach to thwart
wormhole attacks in ad-hoc and MANETs. The schemes proposed for MANET
and WSNs are not suitable for DTN because of the difference in its network at-
tributes. While MANET and WSNs have end-to-end connectivity and a routing
path, DTN relies on hop-by-hop transmission with a limited memory for message
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storage [18]. In DTN, a few authors [19], [18], [112] have worked on detecting and
mitigating wormhole attacks. In [18], a statistical approach is proposed to detect
wormholes and localise its placement using infrastructure nodes. To improve the
existing statistical approach which show no difference when nodes travel close to
wormhole, they propose a semi-distributed scheme with the helpers framework to
gather and inspect the data for the network. To detect wormhole attacks in DTN,
a Unit Disk Graph model (UDG) [113] is proposed by [19] to detect wormhole
attacks using the forbidden topology which examines the topology of the network
using geometric relationship of the location of nodes.
2.6.5 Preventing Packet Dropping Attacks
Packet dropping attacks are categorised into two groups; blackhole and greyhole
attacks. In a blackhole attack, the attackers drop all the messages relayed to them
even if they have enough storage. In greyhole attack, a fraction of the messages
received are dropped.
The authors in [114] proposed a Ferry-Based Intrusion Detection and Mitigation
(FBIDM) scheme which uses a custody transfer feature. Special nodes (ferries)
are used to provide intrusion detection services to regular nodes. These special
nodes travel along fixed routes which are divided into geographical areas. The
special nodes broadcast a secret message at each location when they stop using a
private key with the assumption that the public key is known by the legitimate
nodes. The legitimate nodes share their delivery and encounter predictability in-
formation when they receive the secret message which is used by the special node
to identify malicious nodes. The authors in [115] propose a Mutual Correlation
Detection Scheme (MUTON). Similar to [114], MUTON also uses ferry nodes
but focuses on the transitive properties. Each node obtains the message deliv-
ery probability of an encountered node as well as the history of its encounters.
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This information is used to estimate its delivery probability of the encountered
node. MUTON and FBIDM use a self-evaluation approach in the detection pro-
cess when a node in encountered by a ferry. The authors claim that MUTON
achieves 50% lower false positive rate when compared to other schemes in de-
tecting malicious nodes. In [93], the authors point out that a malicious node
reduce the delivery probability by forging information to attract messages. They
propose encounter ticket (ET) which is generated when two nodes come in con-
tact and exchange their contact histories. They argue that even with encounter
tickets, an attacker can tailgate to boost its metric. They extend the ET scheme
and incorporate a history interpretation scheme based on trust proposition to
tackle tailgating. A distributed trust-based forwarding is proposed in [116] based
on PROPHET routing scheme to mitigate blackholes. This scheme uses a rep-
utation scheme and a hop-by-hop feedback mechanism to update the reputation
value of a node. A misbehaviour detection scheme is proposed in [117] for Vehic-
ular DTN. To detect blackhole and greyhole nodes, they use a cluster analysis of
nodes that have been encountered. This scheme requires analysing the encounter
record before the message is transferred. In [118], a probabilistic misbehaviour
detection scheme is proposed to establish trust in DTN which is inspired from the
inspection game in [119]. In this scheme, a misbehaviour detection framework is
used based on series of newly introduced data forwarding evidences called iTrust
to establish trust management in DTN, simulation results from this research work
shows that iTrust reduces the transmission cost that is incurred by the misbe-
haviour detection scheme and effectively detects the malicious nodes in single
and multi-copy routing protocols in DTN. Similarly, a dynamic trust manage-
ment for DTN is proposed by [9] to deal with blackhole attacks. This protocol
uses a novel methodology based on Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) for the analysis
and validation of trust protocol. The authors aim at the design and validation
of a dynamic trust management protocol to optimise the routing performance of
DTN in areas characterized by continuous changes. In a comparative analysis
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with prophet, epidemic and Bayesian trust based routing considering two mo-
bility patterns SWIM [120] and CRAWDAD [121] data sets. Simulation results
show that the dynamic trust management protocol outperforms Bayesian trust
based routing and prophet routing protocols without incurring a high message
overhead.
2.7 Summary
This chapter gives an insight to DTN applications with examples of emerg-
ing/challenged networks. An overview of the routing protocols and their charac-
teristics have also been presented. Furthermore, a brief description is given on
the use of DTN for emergency communications as well as the reference scenarios
from ETSI for disaster modelling. In the last section, a summary of the different
mitigation schemes that address different routing misbehaviour in DTN is dis-
cussed. This includes preventing selfish behaviour, flooding attacks, wormhole
attacks and packet dropping attacks.
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Table 2.3: Summary of Proposed Schemes that mitigate Selfish Behaviour
Strategy Description Limitations
Barter trade [83],[80] This is a tit-for-tat approach
which implies that two encoun-
tering nodes must provide the
same services for each other.
Degrades routing performance when
one of the nodes has fewer messages.
Credit Based(Message
Purse Model)[88], [81]
The source node pays credit to
the relay nodes that participate
in the hop-by-hop forwarding of
the message till it gets to the
destination node.
Works well with single copy routing
protocols. In multi-copy based rout-
ing protocols, attacks such as credit
forgery and submission refusal at-
tacks are still possible
Credit Based (Message
Trade Model)[86]
The receiver node pays credit
to the relay nodes that forward
the message until the message
reaches the destination.
Since the source nodes do not pay for
the packet relaying, this strategy is
susceptible to flooding attacks
Reputation
Based(Encounter
Tickets)[55], [93]
Delivers message to any node,
there is no predefined destina-
tion node or group of nodes.
Difficult to detect packet dropping by
malignant nodes. It can only pre-
vent attackers from claiming the non-
existent encounters which is not suf-
ficient to thwart packet dropping at-
tacks
Reputation based detec-
tion (Mobigame)[94]
Delivers message to any node,
there is no predefined destina-
tion node or group of nodes.
Cannot prevent collusion cheating
among nodes to increase their repu-
tation
Reputation based
(Ironman)[95]
The forwarding node including
the source node keeps record of
the message identifier, destina-
tion node and the forwarding
time when there is an encounter
with another node.
Works only with Social Aware routing
protocols with a high computational
overhead
Reputation based de-
tection (Observer-based
Matrix)[70]
Observers estimate the reputa-
tion of nodes based on their in-
teraction patterns and group-
biasness and periodically pub-
lish global node reputation ma-
trix based on which volun-
teer nodes may select an un-
selfish forwarder node during
their data communication
Generation of false token and high
overhead in relayed packets due to en-
cryption.
2.7. Summary 36
Table 2.4: Summary of Solutions to prevent flooding Attacks
Light weight cookie[13] Authentication of forwarding
node, targets media access con-
trol and integrity.
High computational security over-
head as this runs on existing BAB
scheme and a high energy consump-
tion rate due to authenticating each
forwarder.
Queuing mechanism)[14] Uses the concepts of Radia
Perlman’s fair allocation of re-
sources.the estimation is based
on the transitive property of
PROPHET
Works well PROPHET based on its
probabilistic feature,not applicable to
deterministic and other routing pro-
tocols.
Opportunistic
Protection[17]
Packets are relayed to nodes
with same social ties and at-
tributes with the source node
retaining all copies of the pack-
ets sent to the relayed nodes.
Very high delivery cost, there is a pos-
sibility of bundle tampering when re-
taining packets
Token based
Protection[17]
When two nodes come in con-
tact, they both generate a
unique secret bit string (token)
before exchanging packets
This scheme works only when a ma-
licious node spoofs addresses; when
there is no spoofing, the scheme fails
and packet dropping occurs.
Rate limiting
technique[99]
Uses a claim-carry-check distri-
bution scheme to detect packet
flooding attacks based on the
pigeon-hole principle.
It is a protocol-based scheme and
cannot mitigate routing misbehaviour
where a blackhole node creates pack-
ets after dropping the legitimate
packets
Table 2.5: Summary of Solutions to prevent flooding Attacks
Strategy Approach Used Limitations
Statistical Approach [18] Detects wormholes and localises
its placement using infrastruc-
ture nodes.
In sparse networks, the detection time
will be very high due to the sporadic
nature of the network.
Unit Disk Graph model[19] examines the network using for-
bidden topology which uses the
geometric relationship of the lo-
cation of nodes.
Requires nodes to be within commu-
nication range always.
Chapter 3
Trust Management
This chapter presents existing solutions proposed to address trust management
in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network, Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET), Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSN), Internet of Things (IoT) and Delay Tolerant Network
(DTN). It is organised into six sections. Section 3.1 discusses the concepts and
properties of trust. Section 3.2 discusses the proposed approaches for trust man-
agement in P2P networks, while 3.3 focuses on MANETs. Section 3.4 discusses
the approaches proposed for trust management in WSNs while 3.5 focuses on IoT.
In section 3.6, trust management in DTN is discussed which is the most related
to our work.
3.1 The Concept of Trust
The concept of trust originated from social sciences [122]. Trust is applied in the
process of making decisions when two or more entities are involved. Trust is seen
as a multidisciplinary concept [123] with diverse views from different fields. The
authors in [124] describe trust as complex mental state of an agent x towards
another agent y about the behaviour m which is important to achieve a desired
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goal g. In Economics [125], [126] and organisational management [127], [128],
trust is established with incentives and also useful for risk analysis. Trust has
also been used in Philosophy, the authors in [129], [130], [131] describe trust as
an attitude towards people. In Sociology, trust has been widely used to reflect
the relationship between groups or individuals [132], [133], [134].
The concept of trust management was introduced as a component in network
security [135]. Trust management models provide the framework for the repre-
sentation, evaluation and distribution of trust within agents or nodes. According
to [136] trust is context specific which applies to the reliability, reputation and
honesty of other agents for a specific purpose. The establishment of trust occurs
when two entities have direct interactions. This trust is obtained without relying
on intermediaries. The authors in [137] point out that trust maybe transitive
with certain constraints. As shown in Figure 3.1, assuming node a trusts node b
and node b trust node c, then by transitivity node a trusts c. The trust that node
a has on node c is described as indirect trust or recommended trust [138], [97].
Generally, trust relationships are subjective and asymmetric. For one entity to
trust in another do not necessarily mean that the other entity has the same trust.
Different levels and types of trust can be assigned by different entities [135].
3.1.1 Trust and Reputation
Several approaches in literature have used trust and reputation together. The au-
thors in [139] and [140] clearly describe trust and reputation. According to them,
reputation is measure which is derived from knowledge (direct and recommended
observations) from earlier observations on entities which is used to assess the trust
level of that entity. Trust is described as the subjective expectation an entity has
regarding another entity which is based on the interactions between both parties.
According to the authors in [141]; ”I trust you becasue of your good reputation”,
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”I trust you not withstanding your bad reputation”. These statements were used
to distinguish between trust and reputation. As reputation about an entity in-
creases, the trust towards this entity should also increase. These two reinforce
positively and a decline in any them can result in a downward spiral [140].
Figure 3.1: Transitive Trust
3.1.2 Characteristics of Trust
For modelling of trust, the following characteristics of trust are considered.
• Measurable: Trust is measurable and can be modelled and evaluated com-
putationally. An entity may have different degrees of trust represented by
different trust values.
• Directional: An oriented relationship exists between two entities (trustor
and trustee).
• Context-Awareness: Trust can be described as a subjective belief about an
entity regarding any situation.
• Opinion: Since trust is based on several factors such as evidence. Trust can
be described as an opinion about a situation. This means that the factors
may differ for different situations.
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• Dependence on Previous Records: Trust depends on previous experiences.
These experiences usually influence the presence and future level of trust.
• Dynamism: Trust must be able to adapt to the environment ’s changing
conditions. Trust can be changed periodically with time. This property is
very important in wireless networks due to its nature; therefore, the notion
of reasoning and learning should be considered.
• Conditional Transfer: There are conditions which are often bound to the
objectives of the evaluating entity (trustor). Trust related information can
transverse along a chain of trusted entities.
3.1.3 Trust Properties
According to [142], the concept of trust is affected by so many measurable and
non-measurable properties. Trust is more related to security as it ensures safety
of the user and the security of the system. However, several factors such as
reliability, availability, goodness, strength and the behaviour of an entity can also
be used to determine trust. The concept of trust also covers privacy. An entity
must trust a neighbour to disclose sensitive information about itself [143]. A
summary of the properties that influence trust is discussed in Table 3.1 based on
[141], [144], [145], [146] and classified into different categories.
3.2 Computational Trust Models
The concept of trust models has been widely used in different application and
context/ situation-specific scenarios. All though many computational models
have been proposed in literature including Bayesian [147], [148], [149], weighted
summation [150], [151], Game Theory [118], [152], [153], Graph Based [154], Fuzzy
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Table 3.1: Summary of properties that influence trust
Entity Properties
Objective properties related to
the trustor
Evaluation, Set of Standards, a required degree of
attainment
Subjective properties related to
the trustor
Willingness, Belief, confidence, reliance, expecta-
tions
Objective properties related to
the trustee
Reliability, dependability, timeliness, predictabil-
ity, behaviour
Subjective properties related to
the trustee
Goodness; Honesty, Benevolence
Context Purpose of trust, Circumstances involving risk,
environment (agents entities involved, place and
time)
logic [155], Information theory [156]. The computational trust models we have
identified which are closely related to our work are described briefly.
3.2.1 Bayesian Models
The authors in [157] introduced Bayesian statistics in P2P and Ad-hoc networks
for the representation of the reputation of nodes and formulation of trust relation-
ships. Bayesian approaches formulate trust based on probabilistic distributions
which is considered as a stochastic process. In this model, the observed evidences
are used as likelihood to compute the posterior distribution. Bayesian models
assume a prior distribution of the value of trust. When a new evidence is ob-
served, the new prior distribution (previous evidence) is used to compute the
next posterior iteratively. As described in [136], direct and indirect observations
can be obtained from positive and negative behaviours. Indirect trust can be
obtained by discounting using Confidence factor [158] or Belief [137] of the eval-
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uating node about the behaviour of the nodes providing recommendations. In
wireless networks, conjugate prior distributions have been widely used to develop
trust models such as Dirichlet and Beta distribution models [147], [159], [148].
The Bayesian trust model is based on Bayes Theorem which is used to estimate
the probability of a node to misbehave. The probability of the random variable
is given as;
P (B|A) = P (A|B)P (B)∑n
i=1 P (A|B)P (B)
(3.1)
where P (A) is the prior probability, P (A) does not take into consideration any
information from B, P (A|B) is the posterior probability (conditional probability),
P (B|A) is the likelihood and P (B) is the normalizing constant. The likelihood
P (B|A) always assumed as P (x) = θn(1 − θ)1−n. Prior distribution is used in
several approaches to represent initial belief. Beta Probability Density Function
is used to increase the certainty for belief which reflects the prior belief as shown
in Eq. 3.2
P (R|α, β) = Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
Rα−1(1−R)β−1 (3.2)
where 0 ≤ R ≤ 1, α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0. The two parameters (α, β) can be calculated
by accumulations of relayed, dropped, delayed and delivered packets. The mean
of the beta distribution (α, β) is give as α/(α + β), while its variance is αβ(α +
β)2(α + β + 1).
3.2.2 Game Theory Model
Game theory model is a mathematical theory that models and analyses systems
based on best player strategy. This theory deals with the problems using sev-
eral decision makers and objects. In game theory, a game consist of a decision
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makers (N players), a set of decisions taken by each player (strategies) and the
players define their satisfaction which is the outcome of the strategy. Players are
assumed to be rational in game theory and it player tries to maximise its payoff .
Cooperation is used to distinguish game strategies. On the other hand, coopera-
tive games agree on a common game strategy, players in non-cooperative games
have no agreement [160], [161] Two example of popular game theory approach in
wireless networks are;
• Jamming Game : If node Ni wants to send a packet and node Nj tries to
jam the transmission, this means that two channels are available. If Ni
sends the packet on the same channel as Nj, his packet transmitted fails,
while Nj succeeds. The underlying assumptions are: 1. If Ni succeeds, he
gains 1 and Nj is rewarded with −1. 2. If Njsucceeds, he gains 1 and Ni is
rewarded with −1.
• Nash Equilibrium: Individual optimal strategies are adopted by players to
maximise their profit which relies on the strategies by other players. Nash
equilibrium is considered when two or more players have a strategy. Each
participant considers the choice of its opponents and there is nothing to
gain by changing strategies. Every player is considered a winner because
everyone gets their desired outcome. For example, if two players P1 and
P2 play a simple game. In this game, P1 and P2 can choose strategy A
and B to receive or lose 1 respectively. If P1’s strategy is revealed to P2
and vice versa, none of the players will deviate from their original choice.
This is because the knowledge of the other players will not change their
behaviours. The outcome A represents a Nash Equilibrium.
Game theory models [162], [163], [118] stimulate nodes cooperation using incen-
tives to maximise the overall performance of the network. Game theory models
mainly focus on selfish behaviour of nodes and cannot deal with other routing
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misbehaviours. In [164], the authors proposed a game theoretic model for DTN
using a game strategy between normal nodes and selfish nodes. This approach
assumes the attacker strategies to model a trust management framework using
optimal parameters. However, this is not applicable in reality if an attacker or
a set of attacker are dynamic. These assumptions do not consider collaborative
attacks which can be performed by misbehaving nodes. The authors in [9] clearly
point out that game theoretic models often require verification which incurs high
overhead cost in disconnected networks.
3.2.3 Weighted Summation
The weighted summation models [165], [9], [98], [166], [167], [168], [169], [170],
[171], [172], which are also referred to as the average models are the most popular
and straight forwards trust models for trust computation. In this model, the
the observations collected from different sources of information are aggregated
to formulate relationship using a weighed calculation. In weighted summation
models, multiple trust entries including interaction trust, recommended trust,
role-based and certified reputation can be integrated to produce a composite
trust value. One of the popular approaches in wireless networks that integrates
multiple trust entries using a group-based and hierarchical structure [171] makes
use of a weighted summation model. In this approach, trust is computed at node
level based on observations, at cluster head level and at the base station with a
sliding time window.
In DTNs, the authors in [167] formulate trust value based on the weighted av-
erage of the aging factor. In [165], the authors incorporate a social similarity
feature which is weighed and the average value is integrated into direct and in-
direct trust evaluation. In [9], trust is established using the best weight ratio
of four trust properties including unselfishness, connectivity, energy and health-
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iness. The main advantage of the weighted summation model is its simplicity
and it is a linear computation which is easy to implement. The major issue with
weighted summation models is finding the best trust formation using the best
weight parameters to obtain a reliable trust evaluation.
3.3 Trust Management in P2P Networks
In the context of P2P networks, trust management schemes are distributed; there
is no central authority to monitor and evaluate the trustworthiness of nodes in
the network. Each node monitors and evaluates the trustworthiness of its neigh-
bouring nodes. In structured P2P networks, a decentralised trust management
scheme which uses a P2P look up system based on a search tree that is virtually
distributed is proposed by [173]. In this approach, each peer is assumed to be a
trustworthy neighbour unless a complaint is received by the virtually distributed
tree search. This trust metrics used in this approach is based on complaints
received by peers about the behaviour of its neighbours. The authors in [174]
proposed EigenTrust, a secure and distributed strategy to compute global trust
values based on iteration. This global trust is computed using transitivity and
stored in a Content Addressable Network (CAN). Similar to the approach in
[174], a decentralised reputation based trust supporting framework (PeerTrust)
with an adaptive trust model for evaluating the trustworthiness of peers based
on a transactional feedback system is proposed by [175]. Both EigenTrust and
PeerTrust use the trustworthiness of the recommender to evaluate the indirect
trust. The authors in [176] proposed a new fair scheduling technique PowerTrust
to leverage the power-law feedback characteristics. This robust and scalable P2P
reputation system uses a distributed ranking mechanism to dynamically select
nodes that are most reputable in a P2P network. In unstructured P2P, the trust
queries are generally flooded to the network. A detailed model for trust compu-
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tation is not defined in the model as presented in [177, 178, 179, 180]. Peers use
collective feedback in decision making to mitigate inauthentic file downlands.
3.4 Trust Management in Mobile Ad-hoc Net-
works
MANET consists of a set wireless mobile nodes with the each other in the absence
of a fixed or centralised network infrastructure. Similar to DTN, MANETs are
also characterised by frequent changes in the network topology. as a result of con-
strained capability, open wireless medium and continuous disconnection. Several
trust management schemes have been proposed to enhance security in MANETs.
In this subsection, a review of proposed trust management schemes is presented.
The authors in [181] proposed a Collaborative Reputation (CORE) mechanism
to enforce the cooperation of nodes. A watchdog scheme is used to detect the
cooperation between nodes which is complemented by a reputation system. The
reputation system combines direct and indirect observations from the watchdog.
However, only positive recommendations are accepted in this framework which
can result in false positives. A recommendation based trust model with a defence
scheme is proposed to filter trust propagation attacks using clustering techniques
[182]. This scheme pays attention to attacks that are related to dishonest recom-
mended from neighbouring nodes in a particular time frame based on the number
of encounters. To measure and model trust evolution, an information theoretic
framework is proposed in [183] using entropy and probability to acquire, maintain
and update trust behaviours that are associated with the behaviour of nodes. In
the proposed framework, propositions are developed to establish trust through
third parties, assist in route selection and malicious node detection. In [184]
authors extend the notion of traditional trust to data-centric framework for the
establishment of trust based on several evidence techniques. They pay attention
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to networked systems that are highly volatile and resource constrained and use
the theory of Dempster-Shafer to evaluate data reports and compare their results
to weighted and Bayesian schemes. In [185], a fully distributed public key certifi-
cate management based on trust graph and cryptographic threshold is proposed.
In this model, users can issue public key certificates and also perform authenti-
cation using the certificates. The threshold cryptography is used to resist against
misbehaving nodes that issue false public key certificates.
3.5 Trust Management in Wireless Sensor Net-
works
There are several trust management schemes proposed for WSNs. One of the
first reputation-based frameworks for WSNs (RFSN) was proposed by [147]. The
RFSN uses two building blocks which includes the watchdog and the reputation
blocks. The watchdog block is used for monitoring the communication behaviour
of the nodes, while the reputation block is used to evaluate the trustworthiness
of sensor nodes using a Beta distribution framework. In [186], a Parameterized
and Localized trUst Scheme (PLUS) is proposed, PLUS uses both direct and rec-
ommended trust to build trust relationships among sensor nodes. The integrity
of a packet is checked when a trusted node receives a packet from a node that
is suspected to be malicious. The trust value of the suspected node is reduced
when the integrity check fails irrespective of whether the node was involved in
the malicious activity. Another strategy [187] is proposed for cluster-based WSN.
This distributed trust-based framework uses a mechanism to select trustworthy
cluster heads. In this approach, trust is modelled using weighing mechanisms of
some parameters including packet drop rate, control packets and data packets.
Each node stores these weighing mechanism in a trust table and sends feedback
to the selected cluster heads. In event-driven WSNs, authors in [188] propose a
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reputation based protocol (TIBFIT) to diagnose and mask arbitrary node fail-
ures. This protocol analyses the binary reports from neighbours to determine
the occurrence of an event. An active detection-based security (ActiveTrust) and
trust scheme is proposed for WSNs by [189]. This trust-based routing scheme
uses the trust level of neighbouring nodes and the trust requirements of a packet
to select an optimal forwarding path. ActiveTrust creates detection routes to
compute nodal trust thereby preventing blackhole attacks and optimizing the
lifetime of the network. An integrated trust management framework (iTrust) is
proposed in [190] to evaluate the trustworthiness of nodes in the neighbourhood
using monitor nodes. These special nodes gather information about neighbouring
nodes and share their trust indices with encountered nodes which is used to make
forwarding decisions.
3.6 Trust Management in Internet of Things
This subsection looks at the proposed schemes in literature towards a trustworthy
IoT. In [191], the authors propose three properties of trust (community interest,
cooperativeness and honesty) in the evaluation of IoT nodes. In their model,
they consider an IoT system that is deployed in smart community with each
node performing its trust evaluation independently. The proposed trust manage-
ment protocol uses direct and indirect trust to evaluate the trustworthiness of IoT
nodes. The community-interest trust is used to determine the social similarity
of the evaluating and evaluated node. The cooperativeness properties evaluates
the level of cooperation between the evaluator and the evaluated node. With
extensive simulations, they conclude that their proposed protocol can adapt to
dynamically changing environments using the best trust formation. In [192], the
authors propose a trust management framework (TRM-IoT) based on fuzzy sys-
tems. TRM-IoT is based success rate in packet forwarding. It uses local agents to
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establish trust relationships. However, the authors in [142] argue that TRM-IoT
is far from satisfying the objectives of trust formulation in IoTs. A subjective
trust management model is proposed in [193] to establish social relationships
among IoT nodes. In this approach, members use the information provided by
neighbours to build a reliable system. Each node evaluates the behaviour of its
neighbours based on its own experiences and the opinion from common neigh-
bours. They combine the credibility and centrality of nodes to demonstrate how
their proposed approach deals with malicious behaviours. A fuzzy trust-based
model with access control is proposed by the authors in [194]. This scheme com-
putes trust based on knowledge, experience and recommendations. These factors
are mapped into the access control model to evaluate the trust worthiness of an
IoT device. The authors claim that the proposed scheme achieves scalability and
energy efficiency. In [195], a multi-service trust management approach is proposed
for IoT systems. In this approach, context-awareness is used to establish trust
relationships. This scheme solely relies on centralised servers to collect and ag-
gregate trust data which is not applicable in IoT environments. Related to [191],
the authors in [196] pay attention to distributed collaborative filtering in service
oriented architectures. The distributed collaborative filtering mechanism is used
to select feedback based on the rating of friendship similarity, community of in-
terest and social contact. This approach keeps only a subset of nodes of interest
when computing trust to achieve scalability. Similar to [196], an adaptive trust
management for social IoT systems is proposed in [197]. In this approach, social
relationships evolve between the users of IoT devices dynamically. The authors
also identify the trade-off between convergence and fluctuation and incorporate
a table-lookup method to apply the result analysis dynamically.
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3.7 Trust Management in Delay Tolerant Net-
work
An iterative trust management scheme ITRM is proposed in [166], [167]. ITRM
uses authentication as an underlying mechanism to evaluate the trustworthiness
of a node. Upon an encounter, a node exchanges its trust evaluation with neigh-
bouring nodes. Trust records that are inconsistent are identified and removed
iteratively. A graph-based iterative algorithm with malicious node detection
mechanism is used mitigate Byzantine attacks. However, the authors did not
evaluate the impact of ITRM on the routing performance which is very impor-
tant for resource constrained networks. Another major drawback is that the
proposed scheme does not leverage on any context oe situational-awareness to
formulate trust relationship between nodes.
In [198], a trust-based framework is proposed for data forwarding in OppNets.
Similar to [97], a reputation-based framework is designed to evaluate the com-
petency of an encountered node to forward packets. The authors claim that
this scheme can be integrated into existing routing protocols. The forwarding
behaviour of a node is monitored using a Positive Feedback Message (PFM). A
reputation assisted forwarding scheme (RADON) is designed and integrated into
a routing scheme based on encounter records. The authors claim that RADON
outperforms encounter based routing protocols and effectively improves the net-
work performance.
The authors in [98], [199] propose a reputation-based forwarding protocol to mit-
igate blackholes in DTN. In this approach, each node maintains the reputation of
encountered nodes. Trust relationship is formulated based on three mechanisms;
nodes list, acknowledgement and aging factor. The proposed scheme is extended
to Content-Aware Routing (CAR) [200]. This protocol RCAR (Reputation-based
CAR) is compared with [198] and evaluation results show that RCAR outperforms
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the trust-based data forwarding framework proposed in [198].
A Cooperative Watchdog Scheme (CWS) proposed by [201] for VDTN assigns a
reputation score to each node in the network. When a node comes in contact with
another node based on the evaluation of three modules (classification,neighbour’s
evaluation and decision), the classification module categorises the nodes into dif-
ferent groups based on their reputation score and calculates the cooperative value
of each node. The cooperative value is sent to decision module for punishment or
reward, while the neighbour’s evaluation module determines how the reputation
of a node is evaluated on the network. The CWS relies on direct and indirect
trust evaluation only, however some important metrics such as the average re-
maining energy is not considered which could lead to false negatives when using
mobile nodes. CWS has not also addressed bad-mouthing and ballot stuffing
attacks which could mislead the classification module and cause malfunction in
accurately reporting the trust worthiness of a node.
A dynamic trust management for DTN is proposed by [9] to deal with selfish
and malicious misbehaviours. This protocol uses a novel methodology based on
Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) for the analysis and validation of trust protocol. The
authors aim at designing and validating a dynamic trust management protocol to
optimise the routing performance of DTN. They incorporate Quality of Service
(QoS) with social trust to evaluate a node’s trustworthiness. In this approach,
energy and connectivity are used as trust metric to evaluate the trustworthiness
of an encountered node. They also use the selfishness and healthiness as proper-
ties (trust metric) to compute the the social trust of a node. In a comparative
analysis with PROPHET, Epidemic and Bayesian trust-based routing, their sim-
ulation results show that the dynamic trust management protocol outperforms
Bayesian trust based routing and PROPHET routing protocols without incurring
a high message overhead. As pointed out in a comprehensive survey [146] that
trust metrics must reflect unique properties of trust for building trust manage-
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ment systems, the proposed scheme uses a synthetic model which does not reflect
mission context scenarios which are typical applications of DTN.
A probabilistic misbehaviour detection scheme (PMDS) [118] is proposed to es-
tablish trust in DTN which is inspired by the inspection game in [119]. In this
scheme, a misbehaviour detection framework is used based on series of newly in-
troduced data forwarding evidences called iTrust to establish trust management
in DTN, simulation results from this research work shows that iTrust reduces
the transmission cost that is incurred by the misbehaviour detection scheme and
effectively detects the malicious nodes in single and multi-copy routing protocols
in DTN. The proposed scheme is a reputation-based detection technique, how-
ever authors have not compared the proposed scheme with any existing detection
scheme and the performance metrics does not reflect if the scheme has improved
delivery probability in the network. It is also very expensive when compared to
other approaches as there is a high transmission overhead and verification cost
incurred when contacting the Trusted Authority (TA) to inspect the delegation
history.
A Collaborative Contact-based Watchdog (CoCoWa) is introduced by [202], the
CoCoWa scheme combines the local watchdog detection and dissemination of this
information on the network. Their approach focuses on reducing the detection
time and improving precision by reducing the effects false positive and negative
values. When a node encounters another node, the diffusion module transmits
and processes the positive and negative detections. Analytical and experimental
results presented show that there is a reduced detection time and message cost
when nodes collaborate using the diffusion module.
In [165], a trust-based routing scheme is proposed based on social similarity
(TRSS) for opportunistic networks. In the proposed scheme, the authors incor-
porate trust in the forwarding decisions to mitigate selfishness and trust related
attacks such as collaborative attacks, trust-boosting and defamations. Motivated
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by Social Networks [203] where inter-contact times are more frequent, the formu-
late trust based on social similarity derived from the social history record. The
Social similarity is the degree of similarity between two nodes ni and nj where ni
is the relay node and nj represents the destination node. If ni has higher simi-
larity compared to other nodes, it has a better chance of coming in contact with
the destination node nj. In this scheme, the source node ns broadcast the profile
of the destination node. The neighbouring nodes compute their social similarity
based on the social history record which is combined with the direct and indirect
trust to make forwarding decision. An encounter-based acknowledgement tech-
nique is used to confirm the forwarding behaviour of an encountered node which
results in an extra message overhead. The authors claim that the proposed trust
management scheme combines trust-based routing and social similarity to miti-
gate malicious misbehaviours in OppNets.
3.8 Summary
This chapter presents trust management approaches that have been proposed to
monitor the behaviour of nodes and evaluate their trustworthiness. The proposed
solutions were categorised into Peer-to-Peer networks, Mobile ad hoc networks,
Wireless Sensor Networks, Internet of Things and Delay Tolerant Networks. The
concept of trust, its characteristics and attributes have been discussed extensively.
More related to our work, a comparison of proposed trust management solutions
for Delay Tolerant Networks is presented in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Comparison of Trust Management Approaches for DTN
Schemes Trust Metrics Trust Computation Attacks Consid-
ered
Trust Model Optimization of
Routing Perfor-
mance
Context-
Awareness
ITRM [166],
[167]
Delivery probability &
distance metric (inconsis-
tency)
Direct & indirect Bad-mouthing &
ballot-stuffing
Weighted summation No No
RADON &
T-PROPHET
[198]
Delivery probability & No
of relayed messages
Direct & Indirect Blackhole Bayesian Yes No
Dini et. al.
[98], [199]
Delivery probability & Re-
layed messages
Direct & Indirect Blackhole Weighted summation No No
CWS [201] Delivery probability, Deliv-
ery delay & Dropped pack-
ets
Direct & Indirect Selfish behaviour Watchdog &
Weighted summation
No No
Chen et. al. [9] Selfish behaviour, connec-
tivity & energy
Direct & indirect Self-promoting, Bad-
mouthing & Ballot-
stuffing
Weighted summation Yes Social trust
PMDS [118] Detection probability &
Detection accuracy
Direct Blackhole and Grey-
hole
Game Theory Yes No
COCOWA
[202]
Detection accuracy Direct & Indirect Selfishness Watchdog &
Bayesian
No No
TRSS [165] Delivery ratio, Latency,
Delivery cost, Detection
time, Ack delivery ratio &
Average trust value
Direct & Indirect Self-promoting,
Packet dropping, Self-
ishness, Collaborative
Weighted summation Yes Social
Proposed
Schemes
Delivery ratio, Overhead
ratio, Detection accuracy,
Latency & Dropped pack-
ets
Direct, Indirect & En-
ergy
Dropping misbe-
haviour, Ballot-
Stuffing & Bad-
mouthing (Collabora-
tive attacks)
Bayesian & Weighted
summation
Yes Event-driven
and context-
based
Chapter 4
A Collaborative Content-Aware
Trust Management Scheme for
Emergency Communications
This chapter presents the design and evaluation of a collaborative content-aware
trust-assisted data forwarding approach for emergency communications. One
advantage of an emergency communication network is the frequent inter-contact
times between nodes. As pointed out in [38] and [64], the mobility patterns
captured in a well-planned disaster recovery shows that the recurrence of these
mobility patterns can be exploited to increase message delivery. These recurrence
exist as a result of movement of responders. For example, Main coordination
centre releases medical supplies which are delivered to the evacuation centres
and the police vehicle have specific routes. Although the first responders may
produce a divergent mobility pattern when an event is triggered, this ends up
as a convergence move when the casualties are moved to the casualty collection
point (CCP) or temporary care centre (TCC) [66].
In this Chapter, a collaborative content-aware trust management scheme (CCTMS)
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is proposed to deal with both selfish and malicious nodes. The proposed trust
model evaluates the trustworthiness of an encountered node based on direct and
indirect trust encounters. The recurrence in the mobility pattern of nodes is
exploited to form similarity trust based on transitivity and content. CCTMS
exploits beta distribution to estimate the trustworthiness of an encountered node
and Jaccard’s similarity coefficient to compute the transitive and content simi-
larity between encountered nodes.
4.1 System Model
In this chapter, the disaster scenario described in ETSI reference scenario [66] for
the deployment of emergency communications is considered.
In this chapter, it is assumed that there is no trusted authority in the emer-
gency communication network. Each node observes its neighbour’s behaviour
with omnidirectional transceivers. Without loss of generality, all nodes have the
same transmission range. Furthermore, it is assumed that each node shares its
event features which is stored in the encounter records. These event features are
used in the computation of trust similarity for cooperative forwarding. This may
raise privacy concerns as users may not want to share their event records. The
extension of the CCTMS to provide some level of privacy is left as the future
work.
With the destruction of communication infrastructure, nodes communicate with
each other using intermediary relay hops. Messages are forwarded based on the
trust relationship established between two encountered nodes. A node evaluated
based on its forwarding behaviour which is used to establish direct and recom-
mended trust. Trust similarity is also integrated into the proposed framework.
Trust similarity is computed using the event features. Two event features are con-
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sidered: the encounter graph formed from the recurrence in the mobility pattern
of nodes and the content similarities in the event description.
This thesis considers a trust management framework that is built upon the re-
quirements and dynamic characteristics of DTN. The proposed schemes is appli-
cable to distributed systems such as peer-to-peer systems, social networks and
IoT systems. Monitoring the behaviour of a node is achieved almost in the same
manner regardless of the domain and despite the requirements and characteristics
of a particular domain. To design a trust management framework for the monitor-
ing of evaluation of nodes, this thesis considers distributed and semi-distributed
trust which will be discussed as our last contribution in this thesis. To provide
more clarity, some basic terminologies are defined.
1. Node: A node in this context refers to a mobile device. It is assumed
that each node is equipped with a radio interface for communication such
as Bluetooth for communicating at short-range. All nodes have the same
transmission range.
2. Mobility Model: Mobility models are generally characterised by the move-
ment pattern of nodes. Several mobility models have been developed and
used for evaluation in DTN including Shortest Path Map-Based Model,
Random Way Point, Working Day Movement Model [204]. In this work, the
Post-Disaster Mobility [38] model is used to evaluate the proposed CCTMS.
More details of the PDM is presented in the next section.
4.1.1 Assumptions
The proposed trust management scheme in this chapter and subsequent chapters
do not require cryptographic task to transmit packets. However, these schemes
can be used with security techniques in other domains. The assumptions in this
thesis are discussed as follows.
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1. Nodes have a unique identity which are not changed during simulation.
2. A node’s trustworthiness is based on a trust threshold which is predefined
and discussed for each scheme in subsequent chapters.
3. Nodes evaluate the future behaviour of encountered nodes based on previous
experiences.
4.1.2 Post Disaster Mobility Model
The PDM model proposed in [38] is adopted for the evaluation of CCTMS. Since
abstract mobility models such as Random Way Point and the Map Based models
do not capture the inherent recurrence in mobility-aware scenarios. In the PDM
model, different role-based movements are described based on a given map. The
PDM model assumes that there are main coordination centres and evacuation
centres similar to the ETSI reference guide on large scale disasters [66]. Rescue
workers and volunteers are deployed to these evacuation centres to dispense relief
materials. Another set of responder include the police patrol who cover a larger
area to prevent criminal activities such as looting.
The map of the disaster area is part of Helsinki, the capital of Finland. The map
is available as part of the ONE simulator which is used in the evaluation of or
proposed schemes. The map compromises of connected road segments which are
used to construct clustered neighbourhoods where the movement of the people
and vehicles can occur. The Helsinki city scenario area is 8700m × 7300m [38].
The rescue operation begins after disaster with centres declared to take part in
the recovery operation including evacuation camps, medical centres relief centres,
hospital and police. These centres are locations that are static on the disaster
map and also visited frequently by the emergency responders that participate in
the recovery operation.
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The PDM is modelled with four different mobility patterns. The rescue workers
are the main response team, while vehicles move between centres to supply relief
materials and services. The four main mobility patterns in the PDM include:
1. Movement Between Centres: This is the movement of vehicles between a
set of designated centres such as movement between the main coordination
centre and the relief camp for the supply of relief materials.
2. Event-driven movement: When an event is triggered at a designated centre
such as casualty alert, the associated responder nodes move into the incident
area and return to their centre after a certain period.
3. Cyclic route: Moving agents such as the police patrol take cyclic routes.
This involves frequently visiting points of interest and later returning to
their designated centre.
4. Convergence movement: The rescue workers are often associated with this
movement pattern. Nodes with specific functions such as reporting to co-
ordination centre at different time intervals or movement to the incident
area and re-converging at the relief camps are examples of the convergence
mobility patterns.
In the PDM model, the following set of responder agents take part in the recov-
ery operation: volunteers, rescue workers, ambulance and fire trucks and police
patrols. The one is an extension of the Shortest Path Map-Based Movement
model with four extensions which including static movements, between centre
movements, rescue worker movements and the police patrol movement.
4.1.3 Attack Model
In this chapter, three types of nodes are classified in the network including self-
ish, malicious and normal nodes. Malicious and selfish behaviours represent a
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serious threat against routing in DTNs. Due to the selfish nature and energy
consuming, selfish nodes are not willing to forward bundles for others without
sufficient rewarding [118]. As an adversary, the malicious nodes arbitrarily drop
messages, which often take place beyond others observation, leading to serious
performance degradation [164]. Selfish nodes drop packets based on their rational
consideration to save their own resources. On the other hand, a normal node is
described as a node that performs its routing functions without showing signs
of misbehaviour or compromise. Several authors describe normal nodes as nodes
with insignificant packet loss ratio. These are well-behaved nodes that make for-
warding decisions following the routing principle [93], [145]. A normal node will
have a higher trust value when compared to malicious or selfish nodes. Selfish
and malicious nodes drop packets relayed to them to save resources and disrupt
the network respectively. It is assumed that attackers that are malicious may
provide false recommendations for other malicious nodes to attract more packets
to themselves and drop them later. Nodes that are well behaved can also be de-
famed by the submission of bad recommendations by malicious attackers against
the well-behaved nodes.
4.2 Proposed Framework
The trustworthiness of a node is evaluated based on its observed behaviour. There
are different aspects of a node’s behaviour that can be monitored when there is
end-to-end connectivity such as its capacity to perform encryption, timely trans-
mission of its periodic routing information and the integrity of its control packets.
However, this is not possible in resource constrained networks like DTN where
there is no guaranteed end-to-end connectivity. To evaluate the trustworthiness of
an encountered node in DTN, there are multiple aspects of behaviour that can be
monitored including packet forwarding, consistency of reporting results, the spe-
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cific actions performed by routing protocols, remaining power resources (battery
lifetime) and the trust value obtained by third parties [201], [144]. The evaluation
of the behaviour of neighbouring nodes achieves the following objectives:
1. Detects malicious and faulty nodes in the network.
2. Nodes in the network make decisions based on trust values.
3. It addresses routing misbehaviour and security threats in the network.
4. It improves the robustness of the network.
4.2.1 Terminologies in Trust Management
1. Trust: Trust is the degree of believe about an encountered node in the
network which is often based on trust rating of the encountered node [157].
2. Direct Trust: This is the observation of a node about an encountered node’s
behaviour.
3. Indirect Trust: This is often referred to as second-hand information or
recommendations given by neighbouring nodes about an encountered node.
4.2.2 Metrics considered for Trust Establishment
Several metrics have been considered for the establishment of trust as discussed
in [178]. In the proposed scheme, the following metrics are considered for trust
establishment:
1. Packet Forwarded: This is the number of messages relayed by an evaluated
node.
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2. Packets Dropped: This is the number of messages dropped by an encoun-
tered node being evaluated.
3. Energy Consumption: This is the remaining energy of the evaluated node
which must be above a pre-defined threshold.
4. Latency distributions from the encounter graph: This is used to compute
trust transitivity which is based on similarities in frequently visited areas
(Points of Interest) and the inter-contact times which measures the delay
distributions between relay nodes.
4.3 A Collaborative Content-Aware Trust Man-
agement Scheme
Figure 4.1 describes the proposed framework for CCTMS. Three main compo-
nents are deployed to evaluate the trustworthiness of an encountered neighbouring
node. The first component describes the formation of encounter record table from
the pairwise encounter between nodes. Upon an encounter, nodes exchange mes-
sages and each generates an encounter record which is stored in its buffer. This
record includes the identities of the two nodes, the sequence number assigned by
them, timestamps and their interaction records.
The second component describes the trust computation components which com-
prises of data trust and similarity trust computation. Data trust uses direct and
indirect information to establish direct and indirect trust respectively. Similarity
trust leverage recurrence in mobility pattern of nodes to compute transitive (path
trust) and content trust which are based on similarities in Point of Interests and
attributes.
The last component is the trust update/forwarding decision module. To achieve
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optimised and efficient data forwarding in disaster recovery operations, responder-
nodes must select nodes that will relay messages towards the destination with
minimal delay. A trust value is determined as a probability that a node provides
satisfactory interactions, multiple trust values are used to evaluate each aspect
of a node’s interactions with its neighbours. A node continuously builds its trust
metrics for encountered neighbouring nodes in the network by monitoring their
behaviour and rating them as being honest(cooperative) or misbehaving (com-
promised or faulty).
Figure 4.1: Proposed Trust Framework
4.3.1 Trust Computation
The trust computation is based on the history of encounters known as the En-
counter Record (ER). Suppose two nodes i and j come in contact with each other,
ER generated by node i about node j is denoted by ERij = (ER
i
j1
, ERij2 , .....ER
i
jn)
where ERij1 is a single interaction record with node j. This thesis uses the
Bayesian statistical approach similar to [136] for the computation of trust based
on the assumption that Beta probabilistic distribution function is followed. The
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Beta distribution function is used for the evaluation of an encountered node’s
trustworthiness for DTN based on the following advantages:
1. It is suitable for DTN due to its resource constrained nature. Beta distri-
bution is a less resource intensive method when compared to other models
used for the evaluation of trust worthiness. It is a simple store and compute
a node’s behaviour within two values (α, β), where α and β represents the
positive evidences and negative observations accumulated by a node. These
two parameters are very important in the formulation of a trust relationship
as each node observes its neighbours behaviour based on these accumulated
evidences [136], [148]. In wireless networks, Beta distribution computes the
probability of expectation (E(x) = α
α+β
) from a process with two possible
outcomes {x, x¯}. When nothing is known, a priori distribution is the uni-
form beta function with α = 1 and β = 1. Then, after observing r positive
and s negative outcomes, a posteriori distribution is the beta function with
α = r + 1 and β = s+ 1. For example, the beta function after observing 7
positive and 1 negative outcomes will have a probability expectation value
E(x) = 0.8. This means that the relative frequency of a positive outcome
in the future is somewhat uncertain, and that the most likely value is 0.8
[157]. The beta is chosen because of its flexibility and ability to peak at
any time interval. As described in the reputation-based framework for high
integrity sensor networks [147] which is one of the first applications of beta
distribution in wireless networks, the beta distribution model allows nodes
to develop a community of trust and maintain a reputation metric for each
node which represent their past behaviour used as an inherent aspect in the
prediction of their future behaviour.
2. It is very suitable for DTN since messages are replicated several times in the
network. With the accumulated experiences, a node can effectively evaluate
the trustworthiness of an encountered node.
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3. The uncertainty about the behaviour of an encountered node is captured
because beta distribution gives a probabilistic estimation of the future trust.
4.3.2 Direct Trust Evaluation
To measure the confidence in node reliability, each node monitors the actions
of its neighbours and characterise them based on their actions such as relayed
packets, dropped packets, delivered packets and latency. When two nodes come
in contact, they exchange information and form an encounter record. For every
participating DTN node, we assign a reputation value R in the unit interval
[0, 1]. We adopt the classical beta-binomial framework [136] for evaluating our
trust metrics given the rating from each new encounter. When node i computes
the trust value of node j after an encounter, the notation TDij is used to represent
the probability that a satisfying interaction can be provided by j. Considering the
interaction between node i and node j, the two parameters can be used to satisfy
the observation such as pr and pd which denote the number of packets relayed
and the number of packets dropped respectively. It is assumed that the desired
type of future interactions is identical to the previous interactions by setting α =
pr + 1 and β = pd + 1. The estimated value of T
D
ij is obtained by computing the
expected value of the probability distribution function of the beta distribution as
follows:
Tij = E(f(x;α, β)) =
α
α + β
=
pr + 1
(pr + 1) + (pd + 1)
=
pr + 1
(pr + pd + 2)
(4.1)
where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, x reflects the uncertainty about the behaviour
of an encountered node before an interaction occurs [147]. The two parameters
(α, β) can be calculated by accumulations of relayed, dropped, delayed and de-
livered packets. The mean of the beta distribution (α, β) is given as α/(α + β).
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In wireless networks, direct trust is considered as an accurate measure of trust
and its resistant to collaborative malicious behaviours such as dishonest recom-
mendations. The direct trust value of node i about node j is computed as shown
in Eq.(4.2).
TDij =
αij
αij + βij
(4.2)
In a dynamic environment, the impact of previous interactions change over time.
An ageing factor (ρ) is incorporated to address this influence. The function of
ageing factor is to decrease the impacts of previous interactions over time before
aggregating new trust values. This is achieved by the adjustment of previous
evidences. For example, node i observes the behaviour of node j at time ti and
ti+1, the new evidences observed at ti+1 is presented as r
new and dnew. The ageing
factor is used to update r and d before they are merged with the new values. At
time ti+1, r and d will be updated as:
r = rold × ρ+ rnew, d = dold × ρ+ dnew
(4.3)
where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, rold and dold are the previous positive and negative events
observed. Due to frequent disruptions and inactivities, an evaluating node may
not observe new evidences between time ti and ti+1, the iterations between nodes
i and j in this case will be updated as:
r = rold × ρ, d = dold × ρ
(4.4)
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4.3.3 Indirect Trust Evaluation
In DTN, indirect trust must be considered in special cases when two nodes have
not established a previous trust relationship through encounter records. The
evaluation of the trust worthiness of an encountered node suffers from sparsity
problems in such cases as a result of lack of interaction information. The indirect
trust of node TRij is the direct encounter record of j about its neighbours such
as node k, l, ...n. The use of indirect trust metrics is useful in the propagation
of reputation information across a network thereby facilitating the formation of
a community of trustworthy nodes. Node i receives information about node k
through j, these indirect encounter record can be represented as (αkij, β
k
ij). The
indirect trust is computed as:
TRkij =
αkij
αkij + β
k
ij
(4.5)
4.3.4 Total Trust Computation
The total trust composition is calculated by the combination of direct and indirect
trust. Weights are assigned to direct and indirect trust to reduce computational
overhead and collaborative malicious behaviours. The total trust is computed as:
Tij = T
D
ij ×WD + TRkij ×WRk (4.6)
where WD + WRk = 1, the weight is computed dynamically based on the number
of interactions between the evaluating and the evaluated node. If the evaluating
node has enough evidence to evaluate the behaviour of an encountered node, more
weight is assigned to it. However, if the interaction between an evaluating node
and an encountered node is low, more weight is assigned to indirect trust. The
advantages of weighted summation are, its simplicity and its linear calculation
which is easy to implement and efficient. However, it is a challenge to find best
weight parameters to achieve an accurate trust evaluation. The proposed scheme
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considers weighted summation for trust formation to maximize application per-
formance. Similar to [197], [9] [196], equal weights are assigned to direct and
indirect trust and dynamically adjusted based on the level of interactions.
4.3.5 Computation of Transitive and Content Similarity
The authors in [38] identified four mobility patterns undertaken by responders in
the PDM model. These mobility patterns are exploited to form a community of
interest. Since the responders have specific functions, responder similarity and
familiarity are exploited to formulate trust relationships. The interest of a node
in a particular tag may take any value between 0 and 1. Finding nodes with
similar attributes reduces the computational overhead in a constrained network.
The proposed approach considers transitive and content similarity to establish
similarity trust.
Transitive similarity is a link-based approach where the links formed between
nodes in the graphs are examined. These links represent the event similarities us-
ing the structural similarity formed by encounter graphs. In transitive similarity,
the encounter graph formed between nodes were considered in the formulation of
similarity trust. The recurrence in the mobility pattern undertaken by respon-
ders is taken into consideration. For simplicity, the Points Of Interest (POIs) of
each node is used. The POIs are the areas frequently visited by nodes. In this
scenario, the POIs are the centres declared in the PDM model to support the dis-
aster recovery operation. In Table 4.1, the POIs of two nodes at the relief camp
and evacuation centre are used for illustration. Node i determines its transitive
similarity ST with an encountered node if the proportional similarity between the
encountered node exceeds a defined threshold Sij = PS(i, j) > THv where Sij is
the similarity coefficient between nodes i and j.
Content similarity is attribute-based approach that examines attributes of the
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an encountered node. For example, content similarity of a university website
could possibly be based on departments, faculties, country of origin, course of
study, and level of study. In CCTMS, the attributes of an encountered node
is examined to compute the similarity in the record of an encountered node.
In a well-planned disaster recovery operation where centres are declared for the
recovery and rescue operations and groups of responders are designated to each
centre; content similarity can be established based on certain criteria such as the
responder’s designated group and the type of responder. This is illustrated in
Table 4.2. similar to the transitive similarity, a predefined threshold is set for
each event.
To compute the transitive and content similarity, Jaccard’s coefficient [205] is used
to measure the similarity of the interest of an encountered. Upon an encounter
with node j, node i computes the similarity index with node j as:
Sij(Ai, Aj) =
|Ai ∩ Aj|
|Ai ∪ Aj| =
|Ai ∩ Aj|
|Ai|+ |Aj| − |Ai ∩ Aj| (4.7)
where Ai ∪Aj is the interest similarity between nodes i and j and Ai ∩Aj is the
sum of all the interests for nodes i and j. To reduce computational complexity
and overhead, the transitive and content similarity are combined as shown in Eq.
4.8.
T Sij = S
T
ij ×W Tij + SCij ×WCij (4.8)
where T Sij is the similarity trust, S
T
ij and S
C
ij represent the transitive and content
similarity between nodes i and j while W Tij and W
C
ij represent the weights assigned
to the transitive and content similarity. The example given in Table 4.1 and 4.2,
STij is 0.652 and S
C
ij = 0.714 using the Jaccard’s coefficient. The similarity trust
Sij = 0.67 using equal weights for the transitive and content similarity.
This is dynamically computed as nodes interact upon an encounter.
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Table 4.1: A Transitive Similarity Table
Nodes Point of Interest POIs
Ni POI2, POI4, POI5, POI6 POI7
POI8 POI13
Nj POI2 POI7 POI13 POI4 POI3
POI5
Table 4.2: A Content Description Table
Node Content Description
Ni Volunteers, Moving agents, Relief camps, Ambu-
lance & Fire trucks, Police, Fire Station
Nj Supply Vehicle, Moving Agents, Volunteers, Po-
lice, Fire station, Ambulance & Fire trucks
4.3.6 Forwarding Decision
To achieve efficient and effective forwarding of emergency messages in a post-
disaster scenario, nodes must choose next-hop relay nodes with minimum path
delay. However, nodes with the highest trust values may not have frequently
encountered the destination node or have tag sets similar to the next-hop relays.
This often result in a compromise of the routing performance. CCTMS considers
the interest profile which is the similarity metric and the trust value.
In the proposed scheme, trust is measured as a real number in the range of
[0 − 1], in which 0 denotes node is untrustworthy and 1 denotes that the node
is completely trustworthy. These relationships are useful to help nodes decide
whether to forward packets to specific neighbours or not. To avoid cold-start
problem which arises when nodes have no historical trust profile due to data
sparsity, an initial trust value of 0.5 is help by a node about an encountered
node. The trust value is updated after each positive or negative interaction from
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the parameters of beta distribution. Due to high encounter probability, the data
and similarity trust selection threshold is 0.7 and 0.6 similar to the proposed
schemes [55] [115][165] that compute trust based on social similarity and data
forwarding behaviour.
The computed trust value is utilised to detect misbehaving nodes based on the
condition that nodes must have a trust value that is greater than or equal to the
specified trust threshold. The trust value of nodes in static networks are relatively
simpler to compute due to the behaviour of the nodes which are predictable after
enough observations. However, the case is different in DTNs especially when low
mobility and the absence of centralized authorities. The trust threshold value
used in the proposed scheme is based on the average delivery probability similar
to [122], [182] and the average similarity index between nodes formed from the
encounter graphs. Upon an encounter with node j, node i determines if node j
is its next forwarding hop based on the following steps:
1. Upon an encounter, two nodes i and j exchange their encounter records
ERs and update their ER table.
2. Trust Records for nodes i and j are updated based on indirect trust com-
putation.
3. Node i decides whether to forward a packet to node j based on Tij. If Tij is
higher than the pre-defined trust threshold, Node i will compute the trust
similarity T Sij .
4. Node i decides to forward the packet to node j based on Tij and T
S
ij . If Tij
is higher than the specified threshold 0.7 and T Sij is greater than the trust
similarity threshold 0.6. Node i forwards the packet to node j.
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4.4 Evaluation and Simulation Results
In this section, the simulator settings for the experiments is discussed. CCTMS
is compared to other approaches and the results discussed. The Opportunistic
Network Environment (ONE) [49] is used for the evaluation of CCTMS. The
PDM model [38] uses the extended map of Helsinki which covers an area 8700m
× 7300m of for the evaluation of CCTMS. The PDM consist of 5 neighbour-
hoods, 100 rescue workers, 10 police patrol vehicles and 5 main coordination cen-
tres. Emergency messages are generated every 5 minutes. A trust and similarity
threshold of 0.75 and 0.6 are used in CCTMS with a message delivery time-out
of 3 hours. Each node has a buffer size of 50MB and the simulation time for the
evaluation is 48 hours. Responders move with a random speed between 1 and 1.5
m/s while vehicles move at a speed of 10− 50km/h.
4.4.1 Performance Metrics
The metrics used for evaluation are explained as follow.
• Delivery Ratio: This is the ratio between the number of delivered mes-
sages and the number of messages generated.
• Delivery Latency: This is the time taken for a message to traverse from
the source node to the destination node.
• Overhead Ratio: The overhead ratio measures the delivery cost which is
the ratio of the messages relayed to the number of messages successfully
delivered to the destination.
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4.4.2 Performance Evaluation
CCTMS is compared to T-PROPHET [198], CWS [201] and Epidemic [206]. T-
PROPHET is a trust-based framework based on belief theory and used to com-
bat blackhole attacks and other malicious behaviours. CWS combines a watch-
dog mechanism and reputation system to monitor and evaluate the behaviour of
nodes. CWS relies on the cooperative exchange of reputation of nodes to detect
misbehaving nodes while Epidemic routing is a flooding-based routing scheme.
We evaluate the impact of malicious responders on these mobility patterns:
1. Rescuer-to-Rescuer(R-R): Messages relayed by responders among them-
selves for the relief coordination.
2. Patrol In the PDM model, the police cars travel on specific routes as
described in the PDM. Their mobility pattern is captured and messages
exchanged are analysed.
3. Centre-to-Centre: These are the messages exchanged by vehicles travel-
ling back and forth between camps centres and stations.
4. Rescuer-to-Centre These are messages captured from the convergence-
move mobility pattern. Each set of responders have a specific task or duty
and must return to their centre at a specific time. For example, the re-
sponders in the incident area must report back at relief camp at a certain
time.
4.4.2.1 Impact of Different Percentage of Malicious Nodes on the
PDM Model
Figure 4.2 explores the performance of the CCTMS with percentage of malicious
nodes varying in 0− 50 %. Four cases are evaluated and compared: R-R, Patrol,
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C-C and R-C. With a trust threshold of 0.75 and node similarity trust of 0.6,
the delivery ratio remains high even with 50 percent of malicious responders.
The delivery probability of Patrol and C-C mobility patterns perform better
than R-R and R-C. This is as a result of the mobility pattern which oscillates
repeatedly during the operation with some waiting time in between while the R-R
and R-C capture some cyclic route from a particular centre with some randomised
movement in the incident area. The latency and overhead also decrease as the
number of malicious nodes increase because only trusted responder nodes take
part in message forwarding hence the path cost and delay have reduced and these
metrics are calculated from source to destination nodes.
Figure 4.2: Performance of CCTMS under various mobility patterns in the PDM, (a)
delivery ratio, (b) overhead ratio, (c) latency
1. Influence of Weight value on Delivery Ratio In Figure 4.3(a), it can
be deduced that combining direct and indirect trust is very important espe-
cially when there are no frequent encounter opportunities between nodes.
However, the PDM model has frequent reoccurring mobility patterns which
is exploited to enhance message delivery. As shown in Fig 4.4(a) with dif-
ferent weights assigned to the direct and indirect trust. CCTMS performs
better with more weights assigned to the direct trust. This reduces the
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possibility of collaborative attacks from fake recommendations.
Figure 4.3: (a) Delivery Ratio with different weights for Direct and Indirect Trust
evaluation (b) Comparison of Delivery Ratio with and without Trust Similarity
2. Impact of Similarity Trust on Delivery Ratio In Figure 4.3(b), the re-
sults show the impacts of the transitive and content similarity which is used
to formulate similarity trust. As shown in Figure 4.3(b) TS which is used
to denote similarity trust achieves a higher delivery ratio when compared
to WTS which denotes without trust similarity. Exploiting the mobility
patterns of nodes to form trust relationship increase the delivery probabil-
ity by over 0.2. On the other hand, mechanisms such as message feedback
acknowledgement used by [198] helps to isolate misbehaving nodes by for-
warding messages to nodes with positive feedback. It does not consider
exploiting node similarity or familiarity to enhance message delivery.
4.4.2.2 Comparison With Other Approaches
In this section, we compare CCTMS with other approaches with 0 − 50 % of
misbehaving nodes.
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1. Delivery Ratio Figure 4.4 shows that delivery ratio of CCTMS, T-PROPHET,
CWS and Epidemic decreases as the number of malicious nodes increase.
With a trust threshold value of 0.75 and node similarity trust of 0.6. CCTMS
performs better than the compared approaches. Although Epidemic is a
flooding based protocol, it cannot detect misbehaving nodes. Its delivery
ratio decreases faster than the other proposed schemes. Compared with T-
PROPHET and CWS, CCTMS decreases by 0.2 delivery probability while
T-PROPHET and CWS decrease by 0.35 and 0.3 going below 0.5 when
half of the nodes are considered to be malicious. CCTMS selects relay hops
based on transitive and content familiarity which increases the encounter
probability to the destination.
Figure 4.4: Delivery ratio comparison of CCTMS, T-PROPHET, CWS and Epidemic
protocols.
It is observed that even in other mobility models such as Shortest-Path
and Random Waypoint models as shown in Figure 4.5 (a) and (b), CTMS
still performs better than the compared approaches under different mobil-
ity scenarios. The delivery ratio of CCTMS was compared with CWS, T-
PROPHET and Epidemic routing using two mobility models widely adopted
for evaluation in DTN. As shown in Figure 4.5 (a) and (b) the delivery ratio
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of CCTMS outperforms the compared approaches, although CCTMS and
the other approaches compared have higher delivery ratios using the PDM
due to the recurrence of mobility pattern. Epidemic routing which is a naive
flooding scheme has the lowest delivery ratio compared to CCTMS, CWS
and T-PROPHET. In the presence of malicious nodes, CCTMS achieves a
higher delivery ratio and the result suggest that the similarity trust inte-
grated into the trust framework helps in the selection of the next relay hop
for forwarding messages to their destinations.
In general, trust assisted forwarding schemes perform differently under dif-
ferent mobility models [207]. nodes that follow a defined mobility pattern
have more contact opportunities for exchange of messages. In Figure 4.5
(b), it is observed that the mobility attributes of random waypoint model
have an impact on trust evaluation compared to map-based movement mod-
els where there is a uniform distribution. Random Waypoint maintains a
non-uniform distribution which gradually becomes worse as the simulation
time elapses. Although the trust value of an encountered node starts from
one node and propagates to neighbouring nodes, the aggregation of these
recommendations diminish with uncertainty [208]. Similar results have been
obtained using random waypoint by the authors in [209], [207], [210] where
the routing performance of flooding based protocols were compared in sumo-
generated models and random waypoint.
2. Impact on Delivery Latency and Overhead Ratio Delivery latency
(delay) is often attributed to the queuing of messages and retransmissions.
Figure 4.6(a) and (b) compares the average message delay (in minutes) and
the overhead ratio incurred by CCTMS against T-PROPHET, CWS and
Epidemic schemes. When the percentage of malicious nodes increases in the
network, a message which is likely to be delivered with a longer delay will
be dropped. The latency decreases because messages are forwarded to only
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of the Delivery Ratio of CCTMS, T-PROPHET, CWS and
Epidemic Protocols under different mobility models
trusted nodes and dropped messages are not considered in the computation
of the message latency. The delay decreases because the proposed scheme
computes trust on transitive paths that messages transverse across the net-
work similar to existing trust management approaches compared. Delivery
delay in DTN is the time it takes for a message to be delivered form the
source node to its destination. As a result of the recurrence in mobility pat-
tern and the density of nodes for emergency communications, the encounter
probability is still high even with 50% of malicious nodes. This reduces the
delay as messages transverse along intermediary hops. However, when there
is sparsity, uncertainty increases and he network composition may signifi-
cantly change with time time in unpredictable manner due to this mobility.
Similar results are observed in [9], [198]. In Figure 4.6(b), the overhead
ratio decreases as there is an increase in the percentage of malicious nodes
with similar results observed by the authors in [9], [198]. CCTMS incurs a
lower overhead ratio when compared to the other schemes. Epidemic has
the highest overhead ratio due to its flooding nature, while CWS and T-
PROPHET incur additional overhead due to the feedback mechanisms used
in the acknowledgement of messages.
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of (a) Latency (b) Overhead ratio, of CCTMS, T-PROPHET,
CWS and Epidemic Protocols using PDM
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, a collaborative content-aware trust management scheme is pre-
sented. CCTMS exploits the mobility pattern of nodes to formulate trust re-
lationships based on data forwarding behaviour and event similarity. CCTMS
consist of three components: the formulation encounter record tables by nodes
during pairwise encounter, the trust computation based on data forwarding, trust
similarity and the forwarding decision. Beta distribution is used to evaluate the
behaviour of an encountered node while jaccard similarity coefficient is used to
compute transitive and content similarity trust. CCTMS is compared with popu-
lar misbehaviour detection schemes T-PROPHET [198], CWS [201] and Epidemic
routing [206] which is a flooding based approach. The results show that CCTMS
outperforms the proposed approaches. Malicious nodes can collude to drop pack-
ets. However, colluding attack was not considered in this approach. An extension
of this approach will be used to mitigate malicious collaborative attacks by col-
luding nodes.
Chapter 5
A Distributed Trust Management
Scheme For Emergency
Communications
This section presents a Decentralised Trust Management Scheme (DTMS) for
efficient data forwarding in DTN. In DTMS, the overall trust is computed using
the direct, indirect and recommended trust from neighbouring nodes. The trust
relationship between nodes is formed using the Bayesian statistical approach sim-
ilar to [147]. To improve the computational trust model, recommendation trust
from neighbouring nodes is integrated into the proposed scheme. Energy Trust is
introduced as a trust metric and also integrated into the trust proposed model.
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, DTMS extends the trust framework of CCTMS which
was proposed in the previous chapter. DTMS adopts the same components as
building blocks for the formation of trust relationship and further extends their
functionality by incorporating recommendation credibility and energy trust for
data trust computation and inter-contact graph for similarity trust computation.
Recommendation credibility is computed based on the opinion of neighbour-
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ing nodes about an evaluated nodes to provide confidence about the observed
records. Energy Trust [191], [9] is also taken into consideration to maximize the
application-level performance throughout the network lifetime. Some nodes may
have low energy due to intensive transmission at the early stages of the disaster
recovery operation [201], [38]. These nodes maybe unwilling to forward messages
at a later stage. Energy trust is incorporated to DTMS to assess the energy
consumption rate of a node and compute its reliability as a trust metric based on
the residual energy left after message transmissions. Inter-contact graph is also
incorporated into DTMS to quantify and evaluate the trustworthiness of nodes
based on trust transitivity with delay distribution taken into consideration. In
Section 3.1, the proposed trust computational framework is discussed in section
3.2 and the performance evaluation of the proposed scheme is discussed in Section
3.3 while section 3.4 summarises the contributions of this chapter.
5.1 System Model
In this chapter, the system model is discussed. The system model consist of the
network model and the threat model which are further divided into subsections
discussed.
Figure 5.1: A Distributed Trust Management Framework
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5.1.1 Network Model
In the proposed scheme, each node maintains a set of neighbours, which are nodes
that it encounters recurrently. We consider encounters as recurrent if their occur-
rence are more than a given number of times within a time interval. Node delay
depends on the conditions of the outgoing links and the messages are buffered till
such links become available. In particular, delay in DTN does not depend on the
input port a message came from. Fundamentally, DTN delay specifically depends
not only on the next node the packet is forwarded to but also on the previous
node it came from. The proposed scheme is inspired by this observation which is
described as inter-contact delay. Therefore, rather than thinking in terms of the
encounter graphs which was used in CCTMS in the previous chapter, where each
a vertex connects nodes with frequent encounters, an inter-contact graph is used
to represent the encounter between nodes.
The novelty of in the inter-contact graph is the capturing of the recurrence in en-
counter probabilities which shows the dependencies on the delay in both previous
and next hops of the path a message travels. The delay distribution formed by
inter-contact graph is discussed further in the next section.
5.1.2 Attack Model
The attack model is an important component which is utilised to represent the
behaviour of an adversary. Different attacks are used in the proposed scheme and
are modelled with different attributes that degrade the network performance. In
the proposed scheme, we assume that a malicious node exhibits the following
behaviours:
• Dropping Misbehaviour: As discussed in the previous chapter, malicious
node can drop a certain percentage or all the packets they receive from
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encountered nodes. Two types of packet dropping attacks in DTNs include
blackhole and greyhole attacks. Greyhole attacker selectively drops packets
relayed to it, on the other hand a blackhole attacker drops all the packets
relayed to it. In the proposed scheme, 50 percent of the nodes are considered
as malicious nodes in a worse case scenario.
• Bad-mouthing Attack: Malicious nodes can provide bad recommendations
to tarnish the image of nodes that are well-behaved. This often reduce their
chances of relaying packets even when there is an encounter opportunity.
Colluding nodes can propagate these unfavourable ratings against nodes
that are trustworthy.
• Ballot-stuffing Attacks: In this type of attack, misbehaving or malicious
nodes provide colluding nodes with good reputation. This is done with the
intention to drop or modify packets relayed to them.
5.2 Computational Trust Model for DTMS
In DTMS, direct and indirect trust are computed using the same approach in our
previous chapter. Energy trust is also incorporated into the proposed computa-
tional model.The authors in [9], [202] point out that indirect observations often
result in colluding misbehaviours and collaborative attacks as illustrated in [211].
To reduce the impact of false recommendations, recommendation credibility trust
is introduced which will be integrated into the proposed scheme.
5.2.1 Energy Trust
Several authors have integrated energy trust [182], [9], [191], [171] as a Quality
of Service (QoS) trust component in wireless sensor networks. They point out
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that energy is a critical QoS factor of trust. Due to the nature of DTN, all nodes
are energy-constrained and their lifetime depends on energy consumption. In
conventional trust models, nodes forward packets to neighbours with the highest
trust value without taking energy consumption into consideration. The energy
consumption in a DTN environment is directly related to the survivability capa-
bility of a node to be able to execute task completely especially when the future
and current missions require a long mission execution time.
The authors in [212] describe the energy model that captures the energy con-
sumption in DTNs. The energy module computes the energy consumption by
each each node. Several authors [212], [213], [214] have used similar energy mod-
ules to compute energy consumption. Similar to these approaches, we use the
energy profile described in [212] which has been widely adopted for the analysis
of energy consumption in mobile devices. Each node has a battery with an ini-
tial energy as as described in Table 5.1, each time a message is transmitted or
received, or a scanning is performed, some units are subtracted from the initial
energy. In the proposed scheme, we define energy trust as the belief of a node i
that an encountered node j has enough energy to forward messages relayed to it.
Again, watching the energy level of nodes can help in detecting selfish and mali-
cious behaviour where nodes can have more remaining energy if they are selfish
or deplete more energy while performing attacks.
Table 5.1: Energy Parameters
Parameters Settings
Scan Energy 0.92
Transmit Energy 0.08
Receive Energy 0.08
Initial Energy 4800 Joules
An energy prediction model is incorporated into DTMS for the evaluation of a
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node’s trustworthiness. The Residual Energy ER which is the average remaining
energy is computed as EI − EC where EI is the initial energy value and EC is
the consumed energy which is computed as ECE = {Es +Et +Er} where Es, Et,
Er represent the scan, transmit and receive energy respectively. We evaluate the
energy consumption of a node as EC ∈ [01]. It starts at 1, where 1 represents
a node having full energy which gradually depletes over time as nodes perform
their routing functions. The energy trust is computed as:
TE = 1− EC (5.1)
TE must be ≥ energy threshold. In the energy module, a punishment factor is
introduced which is applied to the weight of TE if
Et
Er
< 0.6. It is assumed that a
node exhibits a selfish or a non-forwarding behaviour based if the ratio of Et and
Er is less than 0.6.
5.2.1.1 Total Direct Trust Computation
The total direct trust is computed as;
TDEij = T
D
ijW
D
ij + T
E
ijW
E
ij (5.2)
here WDij + W
E
ij = 1, W
D
ij ∈ [0, 1], WEij ∈ [0, 1] and WDij and WEij represent the
weight values of direct trust and energy trust respectively.
5.2.2 Indirect Trust Computation
As discussed in the previous chapter, indirect trust relationship is considered when
there are no sufficient encounter opportunities. The indirect trust is computed
as:
TRkij =
αkij
αkij + β
k
ij
(5.3)
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5.2.3 Recommendation Credibility
The main reason for the integration of recommendation trust into the proposed
framework is to reduce false recommendations. A common set of neighbours are
considered for trust evaluation. Recommendation credibility is computed from
the common neighbours of the evaluating and the evaluated node. As shown
in Figure 5.2, nodes i and j have common neighbours c1, c2, ...., cn. These rec-
ommendations are filtered and computed as the recommendations for node j as
follows:
RCij = 1− (Tc1j − TRcn(avg)) (5.4)
where Tc1j is the recommendation trust value of node j observed from recom-
mendation c1 and T
R
cn(avg)
is the average trust value from all recommendations.
DTMS does not rely on indirect trust from one node to evaluate its behaviour,
the total recommendation trust is computed as:
TRij = RCijW
RC
ij + T
Rk
ij W
Rk
ij (5.5)
where RCij and T
Rk
ij represent recommendation credibility computed from obser-
vation of neighbouring nodes and indirect trust from node j while WRCij and W
Rk
ij
represent their weights.
5.2.4 Trust Similarity
In the previous chapter, trust was formed using Beta distribution and Jaccard’s
similarity coefficient. Beta distribution was used to observe a node’s forwarding
behaviour, while Jaccard’s similarity coefficient was used to compute transitive
trust and content similarity. Transitive similarity was established based on sim-
ilarities in the encounter graph using (POIs) while content similarity trust was
established using event and node similarity. The encounter-graph captures the
transitive path along a trajectory while the inter-contact graph captures both
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Figure 5.2: Computation of Recommended Trust Credibility
previous and next hop delays. In a network with guaranteed end-to-end connec-
tivity, the egress links are accessible concurrently. For networks with intermittent
connectivity such as DTNs, the delay between links must be computed. To com-
pute this delay for each encountered node, an inter-contact delay table is used to
store the average contact delay between nodes. For example, upon an encounter
with node c1, node i computes the delay between between nodes {ij} and {ic1}
for each recent encounter with j than the previous encounter with c1. Node j
can be any recently encountered neighbour. The inter-contact delay is computed
as Dij→ic1 = ER
T
n -ER
T
ij, if ER
T
ic1
< ERTij, where ER
T
n is the current time of
encounter, ERTij and ER
T
ic1
are previous encounter times with node j and c1 re-
spectively. Figure 5.3 shows a comparison of the inter-contact graph and the
encounter graph. From the obtained results, it can be seen that inter-contact
selects the routing paths with high message delivery probability by providing a
better estimation of the delay distribution. To compute transitive trust, each
hop measures the inter-contact delay and selects POIs based on the inter-contact
graph. Trust similarity is computed as using Eq. 4.8.
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Figure 5.3: Performance Comparison of Encounter and Inter-contact Graph
5.2.5 Overall Trust Value
To obtain the overall direct trust between two nodes i and j, the direct trust TDEij
and the total recommendation trust TRij are computed as:
Tij = T
DE
ij W
DE
ij + T
R
ijW
R
ij (5.6)
where WDEij + W
R
ij = 1, W
DE
ij ∈ [0, 1], WRij ∈ [0, 1] and WDEij and WRij represent
the weight values of direct trust and total recommended trust respectively.
Due to the frequent disruptions in DTNs, the computed trust value for each node
should be updated periodically. However, when the updates are too frequent,
this will result in a high energy consumption. Keeping the trust record window
for too long can result in collaborative attacks. A Trust record window is used
to update the overall trust value periodically. The trust record window is made
up of several time slots for updating trust. Node a evaluates the trustworthiness
of node j as Tij(i) = 1...., ts, where ts represents the number of time slots. The
trust value for the next trust record window is updated as
Tij(i+ 1)new = Tij(i)wiji + Tij(i+ 1)wiji+1 (5.7)
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where i = 1, ...., tn,, wiji +wiji+1 = 1 and wiji and wiji+1 = 1 represent the weight
values for previous and current trust respectively.
5.2.6 Forwarding Decision
The routing decision is very vital to ensure that messages are forwarded efficiently
to the destination nodes in the emergency communication network with minimum
delay. Assuming nodes i and j encounter each other and node i has message for
destination node d. Based on the overall trust computation Tij, node i selects
node j as its next-hop node based on the following criteria:
1. Nodes i and j come in contact and form an encounter record ERij which
also contains an event description record.
2. Nodes i and j compute direct trust relationship from forwarding evidence
and energy consumption.
3. Nodes i and j compute recommendation trust from indirect trust relation-
ship and recommendation credibility .
4. Nodes i and j compute their overall trust value based on direct trust and
recommendation trust.
5. Nodes i and j exchange their trust record and update their trust tables
based on the overall trust value.
6. Node i decides whether to forward a packet through node j based on overall
trust Tij and Trust similarityT
S
ij . If Tij is higher than the specified threshold
0.7 and T Sij is greater than the trust similarity threshold 0.6, node i forwards
the packet to node j.
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5.3 Performance Evaluation
DTMS is evaluated using Opportunistic Network Environment ONE [49] simu-
lator. which is specifically developed for evaluation of networks with frequent
disruptions. The proposed scheme is simulated on the PDM model [38] recom-
mended by IETF for emergency communications. Similar to [214], five neigh-
bourhoods, 4 main centres, 10 relief and evacuation camps, 100 rescue workers,
10 supply vehicles, 10 emergency vehicles, 10 police patrols are used for the PDM
simulation settings which runs for 48 hours. A simulation area of 4,500 × 3,400
m, at speeds of 0.5− 1.5 km/h for pedestrians and 2.7− 13.9 km/h for vehicles.
We use 100 pedestrians nodes and 50 vehicular nodes. For each of these scenarios,
data traffic is generated as a Poissons’s process at the rate of one message per
5 minutes. Each node has a buffer size of 50 MB and the message size is in the
range of 50kB - 5MB. For each experiment, the simulation runs for 10 times with
random seeds and the average of the metrics measured are presented. A trust
and similarity threshold of 0.75 and 0.6 are used in the proposed scheme with a
message delivery time-out of 3 hours. Each node has a buffer size of 50MB and
the simulation time for the evaluation is 48 hours.
5.3.1 Performance Metrics
1. Delivery Ratio: The delivery ratio is the percentage of messages delivered
to the total number of messages created.
2. Overhead Ratio: The overhead ratio is the measure of the routing cost for
delivering a message from source node to the destination node which is
the ratio of the messages relayed to the number of messages successfully
delivered to the destination.
3. Latency: Latency is computed as the average period of time that a message
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needs to travel from the source node to the destination node.
4. Detection Accuracy: The percentage of malicious nodes that can be de-
tected correctly.
5.3.2 Comparison with other Approaches
DTMS is compared with Cooperative Watchdog Scheme Recommendation Based
Trust Model [182] and a Secured routing based on social similarity (TRSS)
[165]. RBTM uses Bayesian filtering to probabilistically estimate the trust value.
RBTM integrates confidence factor, deviation value and closeness centrality to
filter dishonest recommendations. TRSS combines behavioural trust with so-
cial similarity to make forwarding decisions. Social similarity is computed using
weighted average from similar attributes.
1. Delivery Ratio: In Figure 5.4 (a), the delivery ratio of DTMS is compared
with RBTM and TRSS. The results show that the delivery ratio of DTMS,
RBTM and TRSS decrease as the percentage of malicious nodes increase.
RBTMS degrades faster than DTMS and TRSS, DTMS has a higher deliv-
ery ratio when compared to TRSS. In DTMS, The recommendation trust
detects more malicious nodes using recommendation credibility which ag-
gregates recommendations from neighbouring nodes. In RBTM and TRSS
only the forwarding evidence is used to compute trust relationship whereas
energy trust is introduced and incorporated into the DTMS trust model.
TRSS integrates social similarities into the trust framework based on con-
tent similarity while our proposed scheme combines transitive trust and
content similarity to make forwarding decisions.
2. Overhead Ratio: In Figure 5.4(b), it is observed that RBTM and TRSS in-
cur more overhead when compared to DTMS. DTMS takes into account the
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latency distribution when forwarding messages which helps in the reduction
of message hops and the number of messages generated in the network be-
fore it gets to the destination node. In RBTM, the clustering procedure
aggregates recommendations from other nodes but also leads to a higher
routing cost as a result of the time spent in computing the confidence fac-
tor. Both TRSS and RBTM do not address trust update explicitly.
3. Latency: In Figure 5.4 (c), the average delay for message delivery is eval-
uated. RBTM and TRSS have higher delays when compared to DTMS
which computes the inter-contact time between nodes to form inter-contact
graph, while TRSS uses the encounter graph to make forwarding decisions.
Although RBTM uses clustering method to aggregate recommendations,
the cluster manager and recommendation manager drop several messages
and nodes have to wait for recommendations to be filtered before being
forwarded to them to make decide their next hop. The result in Figure
5(c) clearly shows that computing and evaluating the latency distributions
between nodes reduces the time it takes for a message to be delivered to the
destination node. When the percentage of malicious nodes increases in the
network, a message which is likely to be delivered with a longer delay will
be dropped. The latency decreases because messages are forwarded to only
trusted nodes and dropped messages are not considered in the computation
of the message latency. The delay decreases because the proposed scheme
computes trust on transitive paths that messages transverse across the net-
work similar to existing trust management approaches compared. Delivery
delay in DTN is the time it takes for a message to be delivered form the
source node to its destination. As a result of the recurrence in mobility pat-
tern and the density of nodes for emergency communications, the encounter
probability is still high even with 50% of malicious nodes. This reduces the
delay as messages transverse along intermediary hops. However, when there
5.3. Performance Evaluation 93
is sparsity, uncertainty increases and he network composition may signifi-
cantly change with time time in unpredictable manner due to this mobility.
Similar results are observed in [9], [198].
Figure 5.4: Performance comparison with other approaches (a) delivery ratio, (b) over-
head ratio, (c) latency
4. Detection Accuracy under Collusive Packet Dropping: The detection accu-
racy of DTMS is evaluated when malicious or compromised nodes collude
to drop messages. These compromised nodes collude to drop packets by
forming small groups. For clarity, two groups of malicious nodes are con-
sidered. The first group consist of 20 colluding nodes, each group consist of
10 malicious nodes (10× 2), while the second group of malicious nodes has
30 colluding nodes with three groups of colluding nodes (10× 3). For both
groups, a dropping probability of 0.5-1 is considered. The detection accu-
racy is compared with RBTM and TRSS. Figure 5.5 (a), (b), and (c) shows
the detection accuracy of DTMS, TRSS and RBTM. Compared to RBTM
and TRSS, DTMS performs better in detecting colluding nodes. DTMS
achieves more than 70% accuracy in both colluding scenarios considered.
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Figure 5.5: Detection accuracy of (a) DTMS (b) TRSS, (c) RBTM
Figure 5.6: Performance comparison with other approaches (a) delivery ratio, (b) over-
head ratio, (c) latency
5.3.3 Updating the trust value
The trust value must be dynamically updated as it is affected by the percentage
of malicious nodes. Updating the trust value frequently often result in the rapid
consumption of energy. However, the current behaviour of the node may not be
reflected efficiently if the interval for the trust update is too long. Figure 5.6
shows the impact of 30% of misbehaving nodes at 30, 60 and 90 minutes. It is
observed that after 120 minutes, the the time slots for 60 and 120 minutes are
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almost in the same range. Therefore, a longer interval period can be used in this
case. However, when the percentage of malicious nodes varies, the time slot for
each trust update should be reduced to check collaborative and colluding attacks.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, a novel approach to efficient data forwarding in emergency com-
munications is presented. The proposed scheme (DTMS) combines the forward-
ing behaviour of nodes and their energy consumption to formulate direct trust.
Second-hand information from neighbouring nodes are also integrated into the
proposed framework. The second-hand information consist of indirect trust and
recommendation familiarity. DTMS extends the work in the previous chapter by
computing the latency distributions between nodes to form inter-contact graphs.
Compared to other approaches, DTMS has a very low overhead which results in
a lower energy consumption when compared to the other approaches. As a future
work, an energy efficient scheme is proposed which is one of the most important
requirements when a disaster occurs.
Chapter 6
Energy-Efficient
Semi-Distributed Trust
Management Scheme
In this chapter, an Energy-efficient Semi-distributed Trust Management Scheme
(ESTMS) is proposed for emergency communications. Routing protocols for
DTNs may not be suitable for disaster response networks as a result of the replica
transmissions in the network before the message gets to its destination. ESTMS
is proposed for resource constrained networks with limited resources. In the after-
math of a disaster, the traditional communication devices are always unavailable
due to power outages and the damages to infrastructure. For emergency response
operations, battery-powered devices are mainly used as DTN nodes for commu-
nication. In ESTMS, the concept of group management is introduced to manage
and filter recommendations for requesting nodes. While nodes can request for
recommendations directly when they encounter other nodes, ESTMS uses cen-
tre managers to filter recommendations thereby reducing the energy consumption
and computational overhead on the nodes. There are similar models such as [118],
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[164], [167] that assume the existence of a Trusted Authority in DTNs. In [118], a
TA is proposed for the inspection of forwarding evidences. Similarly, the authors
in [167] use judge nodes that act as trusted entities to evaluate the behaviour
of an encountered node. Interestingly, The IETF-DTNWG has been working on
secure key management design alternatives which relies on TAs for signing and
revocation of certificates [215]. The main objective of the TA in the proposed
scheme is to reduce energy consumption from computation and the overhead in-
curred during computation. The last section validates the performance of the
proposed schemes under different realistic disaster mobility traces recommended
by [65].
6.1 System Model
It is assumed that emergency responders move from one task to the other based
on the need which arise during the disaster recovery as illustrated in the earth-
quake scenario in Figure 6.1. As described in the earthquake scenario from the
figure, they are relevant authorities at every designated response centre which is
described by ETSI’s working group on the deployment of emergency communica-
tions SatEC [66]. These authorities are site management team to field workers.
Since their activities are coordinated, we assume that Field Emergency Control
Centre (FECC), Coordinating CFECC, Sub Service Emergency Control Room
(SECC) are the relevant authorities communicating with Local Emergency Man-
agement Authority (LEMA) an off-site area. We integrate some features of the
ETSI model due to its similarities with the PDM model as mentioned earlier in
4.12. We can see from Figure 6.1 that almost all designated response centres
have trusted authorities operating within their coverage to coordinate activities.
The presence of FECC, SECC and relevant authorities can be seen at the Ca-
sualty Collection Points (CCPs), Temporary Care Centres (TCC) and holding
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areas which are similar to the emergency response centres in the PDM. Without
loss of generality, it is assumed that nodes have public and private keys using
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and the public key must be valid throughout
the disaster recovery operation. The use of PKI infrastructure is very effective in
detecting external attacks such as sybil attacks. However, security mechanisms
such as PKI does not guarantee efficient data forwarding as compromised nodes
(insider attacks) can degrade the network by misbehaving. In ESTMS, each des-
ignated centre has two managers : Group Manager (GM) and Gateway Controller
(GC). Each node in a designated centre evaluates the forwarding behaviour of
encountered neighbours and periodically sends its records to the GM. The GM
collects the trust evaluation results and sends them to the GC for recommenda-
tion filtering and the computation of trust similarity.
Figure 6.1: Snapshot of Disaster Scenario with Relevant Authorities
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Attack Model
It is assumed that the attackers can drop messages relayed to them. This dropping
can be further complicated when two or more nodes collude. For this experiment,
we assume that 10− 50% of the nodes are malicious and collude to drop packets
that are forwarded to them randomly. Malicious nodes may also disrupt disas-
ter recovery operation by launching various attacks such as the attacks outlined
below.
1. Self-promoting attacks: A compromised node can promote its importance
by providing good recommendations about itself to other nodes.
2. Bad-Mouthing Attack: Malicious nodes conspire to provide false recom-
mendations about well-behaved nodes. This is done with the intention to
tarnish their reputation so that the can be excluded from relaying messages.
3. Tailgating attack: This is often described as location dependent attack
where the attacker exploits the mobility property of the nodes by providing
false rating at different locations.
6.2 An Energy-Efficient Semi-distributed Trust
Management Scheme
ESTMS is different from hierarchical trust models [9], [171] proposed in litera-
ture where two levels of trust composition is implemented. ESTMS focuses on
the aggregation of recommendations for each trust component. Although there
is a similar trust computation approach where nodes perform peer-to-peer trust
evaluation based on their designated relief centres in ESTMS and cluster in hi-
erarchical trust models. ESTMS performs recommendation trust through centre
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managers with the assumption that the authorities for emergency management
are trusted [216]. In order to reduce energy consumption and computational over-
head, centre managers are used in each group to manage and filter recommenda-
tions. In ESTMS, each node maintains a set of neighbours which are neighbouring
nodes stationed at the same centre. Each group has two centre managers which
high computational capacities which are synchronised at intervals. ESTMS is
presented in with more details in the proceeding subsections.
6.2.1 Direct Trust Computation in ESTMS
Direct trust is computed using Bayesian statistical approach similar to the ap-
proach in [136] which follows Beta probability distribution. As discussed in the
previous chapter, the direct trust computation for ESTMS is computed as de-
scribed in Eq. 5.2. In each centre, nodes communicate with each other when
there is an encounter opportunity based on direct delivery [46]. Upon an en-
counter opportunity with node j, node i sends a recommendation request to the
group manager of its present disaster response centre. The group manager re-
sponds with a recommendation request acknowledgement. The recommendation
request acknowledgement does not require active transmission of messages but
used to acknowledge the receipt of node i encounter records for the computation
of recommendation and similarity trust.
6.2.2 Recommendation Trust Computation in ESTMS
In a well-planned disaster response network, each centre has a trusted authority
such as DTN gateway or control centre communicating to a ground station or Low
Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite. In ESTMS, the network model proposed by Satellite
Emergency working group (SatEC) is adopted as a reference scenario [217]. The
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reference scenario states that there should be one or many Field Emergency Con-
trol Centres (FECCs) and other relevant authorities for each designated response
centre operating in a hierarchical structure. Similar to this reference scenario, it
is assumed that there are two centre managers at each control centre; the Group
Manager (GM) and the Gateway Controller (GC). These control centres synchro-
nise meta-data among themselves. Without loss of generality, meta-data for the
GM contains GMID = {ID,GT,CT,RLT} where ID, GT contains group tables
and CT is the local cluster table which has a list CLT of the nodes and their
attributes CT1 = {NodeID,CT1 , T Sij , TRij }. The recommendation list RL stores
the list of neighbouring nodes used in evaluating the behaviour of node j. Again,
it is assumed that these control centres are highly trusted entities. The GC is re-
sponsible for recommendation filtering, it receives recommendation request from
GM and then filters out the recommendations and sends the cluster table to GM.
Assuming node i sends a recommendation request to GM about node j, GM for-
wards the request to GC. GC looks at its recommendation list between time ti
and tn+1. GC makes a list of recommendations from its cluster table from ti and
{c1, c2, c3, ..., cn}. If ti+1 − ti > tTh where tTh is the time threshold. This process
also helps in the elimination of false recommendations by colluding nodes. The
routing process for recommendation request received by the GM is described with
the following steps:
1. For each recommendation request by node i about an encountered neigh-
bour.
2. GM receives node i ’s ER and sends a recommendation request acknowl-
edgement to node i
3. GM sends request to neighbouring nodes if ti+1 − ti > tTh else GM con-
structs RL={c1, c2, c3, c4, ...., cn}.
4. GM sends the RL to GC for processing.
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5. GM receives CLj={cT1 , cT2 , cT3 , cT4 , ...., cTn}
6. GM sends CLTj to node i
The GM in ESTMS acts as the intermediary component between the evaluating
node and the gateway controller which filters recommendations from neighbouring
nodes. GC in the ESTMS receives a list of recommendations from the GM and
processes it. The GA computes the recommendation list as follows:
1. For each recommendation request list (L) by node i .
2. GC computes indirect trust as in 4.5.
3. GC computes trust transitivity as in Eq. 4.7
4. GC computes content similarity as in Eq. 4.7
5. GM computes trust similarity as in Eq. 4.8
6. GM computes trust credibility as in Eq. 5.4
7. GM computes total recommendation trust as in Eq. 5.5
8. GC constructs a data vector {TRij , T Sij} as CLTj to node i
The main function of GC is to reduce computational overhead by processing the
recommendation and similarity trust of an encountered node. The GC also for-
wards the Cluster List to neighbouring GMs. The trust transitivity is computed
using the inter-contact graph formed with encountered neighbouring nodes. As
it can be recalled, Trust transitivity and content similarity are computed using
Jaccard’s similarity index. In chapter 4, trust transitivity was computed based
on the encounter graph. In chapter 5, trust transitivity was computed based on
the inter-contact times between nodes (latency distributions). In ESTMS, the
inter-contact times is again used to compute inter-contact graph and select POIs.
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6.2.3 Total Trust Computation
In the proposed scheme, the total trust computation about the behaviour of an
encountered node j is computed from the direct trust and received recommenda-
tions from GC. When node i receives the recommendations, it computes overall
trust as;
Tij = T
DE
ij W
DE
ij + T
R
ijW
R
ij (6.1)
where WDEij + W
R
ij = 1, W
DE
ij ∈ [0, 1], WRij ∈ [0, 1] and WDEij and WRij represent
the weight values of direct trust and total recommended trust respectively.
6.2.4 Forwarding Decision
In ESTMS, the routing decision is similar to the proposed scheme in the previous
chapter. Nodes that have high trust values from the evaluation of their pairwise
contact probabilities may not have the required trust similarity threshold for
making forwarding decisions. In this approach, encounter-based routing is used
to relay messages to the next-hop nodes [55] for relaying messages similar to our
previous schemes.
1. Node i encounters node j and forms an encounter record ERij which also
contains an event description record.
2. Nodes i and j compute their direct trust relationships from forwarding
evidence and energy consumption.
3. Node i sends recommendation request to GM which includes his ERij
4. GM sends recommendation acknowledgement to node i.
5. GM forwards the cluster list to node i
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6. Nodes i computes its overall trust value based on direct trust and recom-
mendation trust.
7. Node i decides whether to forward a packet through node j based on overall
trust Tij and Trust similarityT
S
ij . If Tij is higher than the specified threshold
e.g. 0.7 and T Sij is greater than the trust similarity threshold e.g. 0.6. Node
i forwards the packet to node j.
6.3 Performance Evaluation
ESTMS is simulated in the ONE (Opportunistic Network Environment) [49] using
the PDM model developed by the authors in [38] and recommended by IETF
- RFC 7476 for disaster response networks [24]. This experiment is conducted
with 10 evacuation and relief camps, 100 rescue workers, 5 coordination centres, 5
patrol vehicles, 5 emergency vehicles and 10 supply vehicles. Emergency messages
are generated every 5 minutes. A trust and similarity threshold of 0.75 and 0.6
are used in the proposed scheme with a message delivery time-out of 3 hours.
Each node has a buffer size of 50MB and the simulation time for the evaluation
is 48 hours. Responders move with a random speed between 1 and 1.5 m/s
while vehicles move at a speed of 10−50km/h. The group manager and gateway
controller have a buffer size of 500MB each with a transmission range of 1000m.
For the evaluation of energy consumption, we use the energy profile described in
[212] which has been widely adopted for the analysis of energy consumption in
mobile devices. Table 6.1 presents the energy parameters used to compute the
energy consumption.
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Table 6.1: Energy Parameters
Parameters Settings
Scan Energy 0.92 mW/s
Transmit Energy 0.08 mW/s
Receive Energy 0.08 mW/s
Initial Energy 4800 Joules
6.3.1 Performance Comparison of ESTMS with other schemes
The performance of ESTMS is compared with the other schemes proposed in the
previous chapters. In Figure 6.1 (a), (b) and (c), the delivery ratio, overhead ratio
and latency of ESTMS is compared with DTMS and the first scheme proposed
in chapter 4 in the presence of malicious nodes. The result presented in Figure
6.2 (a), the delivery ratio of ESTMS outperforms DTMS and the first approach.
The result suggest that nodes in a centre have a high contact probability because
they can easily get recommendation from the group manager. DTMS also per-
forms better than the first scheme as a result of computing latency distributions
to form inter-contact graph. DTMS computes inter-contact delay for each en-
counter while the first scheme uses encounter graph to form trust transitivity. In
Figure 6.2 (b), it is observed that ESTMS has the lowest overhead ratio when
compared with the other schemes proposed considering that the group manager is
responsible for managing recommendations, this reduces the computational bur-
den on the nodes. Optimising the routing path by choosing the least path delay
route also reduces the number of messages replicated before the message gets to
the destination node. In Figure 6.2 (c) ESTMS has a higher delivery delay when
compared to the other approaches. The result suggest that the delay is from the
group managers that request for recommendation from neighbouring nodes and
the time spent by each gateway controller to compute the recommendations and
forward it to the group controller. A different approach was further exploited to
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investigate the reason for the high delay in message delivery. In Figure 6.3 (a) and
(b), it was observed after several simulation runs that the message delay is as a
result of the trusted authorities and the recommendation-based acknowledgement
between the evaluating node and the group manager. As seen in Figure 6.3 (a),
the delivery delay is higher when one centre manager computes all the recommen-
dations thereby increasing the delivery delay. In Figure 6.3(b), the delivery delay
without acknowledgement is lower than when there is an acknowledgement with
one centre controller. From the two graphs it can be seen that the delay with
acknowledgement when using two centre managers at 0% rate of malicious nodes
is about 2400s and about 2100s when there are no recommendation acknowledge-
ments between the group manager and the node requesting for recommendations.
Figure 6.2: Performance comparison with other approaches (a) delivery ratio, (b) over-
head ratio, (c) latency
6.3.2 Energy Consumption Analysis
The energy consumption of the CCTMS, DTMS and ESTMS are compared in
Figure 6.4. with TRSS and T-PROPHET and Epidemic schemes. The energy
module used in the evaluation was developed by the authors in [212] for the eval-
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Figure 6.3: Latency comparison of ESTMS with (a) 2 vs 1 centre manager (b) with vs
without acknowledgement
uation of energy consumption. This module was extended to the other protocols
used in evaluation. In this experiment, all nodes are subjected to the same rate
of message generation. Figure 6.4 shows the percentage of nodes that remain
alive after 40 hours. It is observed that ESTMS reduces energy consumption by
allowing the survival of more nodes when compared to the CCTMS, DTMS and
the other approaches compared. This directly impacts the ability of nodes to
deliver messages.
6.4 Evaluation of Proposed Schemes under Bon-
nMotion Disaster Mobility
To further validate our proposed schemes using trace-based mobility models, the
disaster area mobility model proposed in [67] and implemented in BonnMotion
[218] is used to evaluate CCTMS, DTMS and ESTMS. BonnMotion creates and
analyses mobility scenarios including disaster area models and is commonly used
for the investigation of the characteristics mobile ad-hoc networks. The disaster
mobility model [67] developed using BonnMotion is recommended by IETF RFC-
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Figure 6.4: Lifetime of nodes
7476 as Model 2 for ICN baselines scenarios for disaster recovery.
6.4.1 System Model
The disaster area mobility model consist of five centres; the technical area com-
mand, casualty clearing section, ambulance parking point, victims treatment cen-
tre and the incident area. Similar to the PDM used in evaluation of CCTMS,
DTMS and ESTMS, the five main areas are declared as centres for the disaster
recovery operation. All nodes used in this scenario share the same attributes as
discussed in Table 6.2. The scenario described in BonnMotion is based on a large
catastrophe manoeuvre which occurred in Cologne in May 2005 with over 250
people injured.
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Figure 6.5: Disaster Area Scenario of BonnMotion
Table 6.2: Simulation settings
Parameters Values
Mobile nodes 150
Simulation Time 48 hours
Simulation Area 350m by 200m
Pedestrian and Vehicle
speed
1-2m/s and 5-
12m/s
Message generation rate 5 messages/min
Message size 128 kB
Buffer size 50 MB
Percentage of malicious
nodes
10-50%
6.4.2 Performance Comparison of CCTMS, DTMS and
ESTMS under BonnMotion Disaster Area Map
Figure 6.5 shows the delivery ratio of CCTMS, DTMS and ESTMS. It is observed
that the delivery ratio for each proposed scheme decreases as the percentage of
malicious nodes increases. The performance drop in all schemes is attributed to
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the increase in the no of misbehaving nodes. ESTMS achieves a higher delivery
ratio compared to DTMS and CCTMS with 0.27 decrease in delivery ratio and
0.25 and 0.23 for DTMS and CCTMS.
Figure 6.6: Delivery Ratio of CCTMS, DTMS and ESTMS using BonnMotion Disaster
Area Map
6.5 Summary
This chapter focuses on an energy efficient trust management scheme for data
forwarding in disaster response networks. The proposed scheme uses centre man-
agers to aggregate trust recommendations. The indirect trust computation and
trust similarity are computed by the centre managers (GC and GM). Simulation
results show that ESTMS outperforms the other schemes in delivering messages
to the destination nodes. ESTMS also incurs a very low computational overhead
when compared to the other approaches. However, ESTMS has a high delivery
delay due to the delay in processing recommendations by the centre manager. It
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is also observed that ESTMS has a lower delivery delay when no message acknowl-
edgement is used. It is also observed in Figure 6.4 that ESTMS is more energy
efficient than the compared approaches. The proposed solution fits into a well-
planed disaster response where there is a control element in each response unit in
the disaster network. The delivery ratio of the proposed schemes are evaluated
using BonnMotion disaster area mobility model to validate their performances.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter summarises the main contributions of this thesis as well as the issues
addressed. The future work is discussed in detail after the conclusion.
7.1 Conclusion
Delay Tolerant Networks are intermittently-connected networks that exploit con-
tacts carried by individuals which may be unpredictable or opportunistic. This
thesis investigates the security threats that may arise in an emergency commu-
nity using DTN and presents novel solutions to mitigate these threats. The main
contributions of this research are summarised as follows:
• In chapter 4, a Collaborative Content-Aware Trust Management
Scheme (CCTMS) for Emergency Communications is proposed for
distributed data forwarding to detect routing misbehaviours such as packet
dropping attacks. In CCTMS, an encountered node’s behaviour is evalu-
ated based on its forwarding behaviour and similarity in attribute. A node
’s forwarding behaviour is evaluated using Beta distribution [136] which is
computed as direct trust and indirect trust from neighbouring nodes. Trust
similarity is also incorporated into the trust management framework for
112
7.1. Conclusion 113
efficient data forwarding. Trust similarity is computed in two folds: (a)
Trust transitivity from encounter graphs based on the recurrence in traffic
pattern and (b) Content similarity which is based on event similarity fea-
ture. Trust similarity is important because a node have high trust value
may not likely encounter the destination node. These two trust components
have play important roles in the forwarding decision. As shown in Figure 4.4
CCTMS outperforms T-PROPHET, CWS and Epidemic schemes. CCTMS
was further compared with the other approaches using Shortest-Path and
Random Way Point mobility models as shown in Figure 4.5(a) and (b)
CCTMS still performed better than the compared schemes under different
mobility scenarios. CCTMS achieved a higher delivery ratio in all scenarios
while degrading from about 0.82 − 0.61, 0.66 − 0.55 and 0.66 − 0.53 un-
der the PDM, Shortest-Path and Random Way Point models respectively.
The performance drop was more severe for T-Prophet, CWS and Epidemic
with degrading delivery ratios of [0.78 − 0.46, 0.63 − 0.48, 0.64 − 0.51],
[0.72−0.43, 0.61−0.47, 0.63−0.501] and [0.68−0.41, 0.56−0.43, 0.61−0.52]
under the three mobility models for T-PROPHET, CWS and Epidemic.
• In chapter 5, a Decentralised Trust Management Scheme (DTMS)
is proposed for effective and efficient data forwarding in emergency com-
munications using DTN. DTMS extends he functionality of CCTMS by
providing Quality of Service QoS to optimise the performance of the net-
work. DTMS integrates energy trust into direct trust computation to en-
sure that messages are delivered to cooperative nodes with enough energy
to relay messages to trusted encountered nodes. In DTMS, inter-contact
graph is introduced which is different from the encounter graph used in the
computation of CCTMS. The inter-contact graph considers the latency dis-
tribution between nodes to compute the message delay while the encounter
graph calculates end-to-end delay. In Figure 5.3, the delivery ratio of the
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inter-contact graph is compared to encounter graph to illustrate the im-
provement in DTMS from the computation of latency distributions with
about 0.74 − 0.95 and 0.6 − 0.87 for inter-contact graphs and encounter
graphs. Compared to RBTM and TRSS, TRSS achieved slightly higher
delivery ratio than DTMS and RBTM but DTMS is more robust under
attack than TRSS and RBTM. In terms of the transmission cost, DTMS
had lower overhead cost and message delay when compared with TRSS and
RBTM. As presented in Figure 5.4, the delivery ratio of DTMS decreased
from 0.855 − 0.683 while TRSS and RBTM decreased from 0.868 − 0.662
and 0.767− 0.623 respectively.
• In Chapter 6, an Energy-Efficient Semi-Distributed Trust Manage-
ment Scheme is proposed for emergency communications. Different from
CCTMS and DTMS, ESTMS assumes the existence of trusted entities (cen-
tre managers) at each emergency centre. These centre managers are re-
sponsible for recommendation computation and recommendation filtering
thereby reducing the computation burden on the nodes. Upon an encounter,
nodes compute their direct trust relationship. The node with the message
sends a recommendation request to the group manager which it acknowl-
edges the receipt from the recommendation manager. The recommenda-
tion manager forwards the recommendation to the gateway controller for
the computation of trust similarity and recommendation trust. Figure 6.2
(a) shows that ESTMS achieves a higher delivery ratio when compared to
CCTMS and DTMS. Even with 50% of malicious nodes, ESTMS decreased
from 0.945−0.789 while CCTMS and DTMS decreased from 0.82−0.61 and
0.82 − 0.61 respectively. ESTMS also performs better than CCTMS and
DTMS in terms of the routing cost. As presented in Figure 6.2 (b), ESTMS
has a very low overhead compared to ESTMS. This is because the number
of messages replicated in the network has reduced and the computational
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burden of computing recommendations has been greatly reduced. The over-
head ratio of ESTMS decrease from 200 − 180 while that of CCTMS and
DTMS drops from about 320−245 and 300−208 respectively. ESTMS has
a higher delivery delay when compared to the CCTMS and DTMS. This
comes from the latency which is computed from the transmission delay,
propagation delay, processing and queuing delay from the centre managers.
Figure 6.3 shows the average latency of ESTMS, CCTMS and DTMS. It
is observed that ESTMS scheme adds an additional delay when compared
to CCTMS and DTMS. Furthermore, the impact of using acknowledge-
ments for the recommendation request were analysed in Figure 6.3 (a) It
was observed that the latency increased when one centre manager is used.
In Figure 6.3 (b), it was observed that the latency reduced from 2613 to
2103 when no acknowledgements were used for the recommendation request
made by the evaluating nodes. Finally, the performance of the proposed
schemes were evaluated using BonnMotion Disaster Area map which uses
realistic mobility traces from the catastrophic manoeuvre which occurred
in 2005. The results obtained exhibit similar trend to the observed results
using the PDM model. This supports the assertion that ESTMS, DTMS
and CCTMS are robust trust management approaches that can withstand
malicious activities and still guarantee high message delivery.
7.2 Future Work
In this thesis, a distributed and context-aware trust management scheme is pro-
posed for resource-constrained emergency communication networks. The possible
research an experimental studies which can be carried out in future are discussed.
• Hybrid Trust Model This thesis proposed two trust management models
(distributed and semi distributed) for message forwarding in DTN. This can
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be integrated to form a hybrid trust model. The hybrid trust model is ideal
for heterogeneous emergency communication. The main objective of the
hybrid trust model will be to enable heterogeneous emergency communi-
cation using commercial off-the-shelves principle on top of commercial and
professional infrastructures as well as the IoT systems. This will provide a
robust and distributed overlay solution for disaster relief missions and tac-
tical networks. The hybrid trust mode will provide adequate information
for the validation of request from unknown responders participating in the
recovery operation.
• Resource Exhaustion Attacks: It would be interesting to further in-
vestigate the impact of insider attacks in resource constrained emergency
communications. Even with authentication of messages, it is difficult to de-
tect insider attacks. This thesis focused on Packet dropping misbehaviour;
however, malicious nodes can perform resource exhaustion attacks which is
quite different from packet flooding attacks. Packet flooding can be con-
trolled using rate limiting techniques, lightweight cookies and other cryp-
tographic approaches. It is difficult to detect the propagation of messages
in DTNs since the routing protocols are mostly flooding and quota-based.
The messages are always replicated till it gets to the destination. A compro-
mised node can drop messages legitimate messages and flood the network
with fake messages since it is a trusted device. It will be interesting to
investigate the mitigation of this type of misbehaviour in DTNs.
• Weighing Recommendations In the proposed schemes, the honesty of
recommended nodes are evaluated over a period of time. In a mobility-
aware DTN, the location of nodes can be exploited for weighting recom-
mendations. Rather than update trust periodically based on different time
intervals, recommendation can be updated or weighted based on time and
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location of nodes to mitigate tailgaiting or location-dependent attacks. This
will be an interested area to further explore.
• Implementation of Proposed schemes in an IoT system IoT devices
almost share the same attributes with DTNs. An IoT system connects a
large amount of tags, mobile devices and sensors to enable information shar-
ing. There has been a growing interest in Social IoT where nodes from a
community of interest. It would be interesting to see how the proposed solu-
tion can be implemented in IoT systems especially with context-awareness
computing which has proven to be successful in understanding of the infor-
mation which a sensor captures.
Appendix A
Performance Analysis Based on
Mobility Traces
A.1 Performance Analysis Based on Infocom06
This section validates analytical results through extensive simulation using ONE
simulator [49]. The DTN environment simulated is set up as described in Table
1.
A.1.1 Simulation Results Based on Mobility Traces
Figure 1 (a) and (b) shows the simulation results of DTMS, CWS, TRSS and T-
PROPHET routing protocols. The results are based on infocom06 mobility trace.
The infocom06 trace was generated from conference attendees for 48 hours with
118 internal and 4626 external devices. The external devices are not considered
during the experiment since the encounter events are not recorded. The INFO-
COM06 trace contains encounter events collected through Bluetooth devices with
118
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Table A.1: Simulation settings
Parameters Values
No of nodes 100
Simulation Time 5 hours
Mobility Model Infocom06
Pedestrian and Vehicle
speed
1-2m/s and 5-
12m/s
Message generation rate 5 messages/min
Message size 500 kB, 1 MB
Transmission Range 100m
Buffer size 50 MB
Percentage of malicious
nodes
10-50%
20 stationary nodes and 78 mobile nodes. For each simulation, 10-50 % of nodes
are considered malicious nodes.
As observed in Figure 1 (a), (b) and (c), based on the mobility trace. The results
exhibit similar trend to that one obtained using the PDM model. This supports
the assertion that DTMS outperforms CWS, TRSS and T-PROPHET. It can be
concluded that the obtained results correlate with analytical results.
A.2 Performance Evaluation based on Univer-
sity of Surrey and Tokyo
We generated traces from the disaster map shown in Figure A-2 Tokyo using real
map world data from a Geographic Information System (GIS) software called
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Figure A.1: Performance comparison based on Infocom06 trace
OpenJump which allows movement of nodes using the roads and walkways from
the map data. We considered the Great East Japan earthquake which struck on
March 11, 2011 that resulted in the death of over 18,000 people in Japan, we
specifically look at Miyako district and tried to follow evacuation routes from
the hazard map in Figure A-2. we considered four hundred nodes participating
in the evacuation process based on the related information given. Fig A-2 is a
map extract from Taro tsunami hazard map, the route for the evacuation of the
disaster victims are marked as red triangles while the welfare centres are marked
as red circles. However, we assume that the welfare office is the Temporary Care
Unit and the Casualty Collection Point and the casualties are dropped at the
casualty collection point and transferred to the Taro disaster recovery district.
We considered 1050% of the nodes are malicious performing resource exhaustion
attacks.
In Figure A-3, 4 and 5, we show the impact of flooding in an Emergency commu-
nication network, the number of legitimate packet decreases as more adversary
nodes take part in the packet flood attack while the number of malicious messages
delivered to destination nodes increases. This type of attack is more detrimental
to the network health of a DTN
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Figure A.2: Impact of packet flooding attacks on message delivery in Direct Delivery
Figure A.3: Impact of packet flooding attacks on message delivery in Spray and Wait
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Figure A.4: Impact of packet flooding attacks on message delivery in Epidemic
Appendix B
Opportunistic Network Simulator
(ONE)
B.1 Introduction to the ONE Simulator
The lack of good simulation environment is one hindrance for research on DTNs.
To evaluate protocols in MANETs, there are several simulators such as NS-2,
NS-3, OMNET++ and several others. The IPNRG developed DTNSIM 1 and 2
which pays attention to routing simulation but does not support application layer
protocol evaluation. Opportunistic Network Environment adds more realism to
DTN simulations by combining mobility modelling, routing and visualisation in
one package with a rich set of analysing and reporting tools as shown in Figure
B-1. Different agents (wireless nodes) can be configured and implemented in
ONE. The nodes can also be grouped with a set of common parameters including
radio range, mobility model and buffer size. In ONE simulator, cars pedestrians
and tramps can be configured and simulated. The movement models, routing
algorithms, event generators and report modules are dynamically integrated into
123
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the simulator with several plugins making it easy to create new classes.
Figure B.1: An Overview of the ONE Simulator
B.2 Mobility Models
Mobility models control the movement of nodes during the simulation. ONE has
three mobility models by default including Random Way Point and a variety of
map-based movement models for more realistic scenarios. ONE also supports
the importation of mobility trace from external sources. The Map-based models
supports imported maps in Well Known Text (WKT) format. WKT is an ASCII
based format which is used in GIS software programs. This can easily be con-
verted using OPENJUMP. Shortest-path map-based model is an advanced version
of the map-based model which has been widely used for evaluation. Shortest-path
selects a certain destination randomly for all nodes in the network and contains
Points of Interest which can be used for modelling of the nodes behaviour. Other
mobility models include Route based models which are used mainly for the sim-
ulation of cars and trams.
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B.3 Routing Simulation
While mobility models determine the movement of nodes, the routing schemes
decide where the messages are sent to. In ONE, six routing protocols are imple-
mented by default including First Contact, Direct Delivery, Epidemic, Spray and
Wait, Prophet and MaxProp. Upon an encounter, two nodes exchange messages,
if the encountered node has a copy of the message, it declines the forwarding re-
quest. The easiest routing schemes are direct delivery, first contact and epidemic
routing schemes. Direct delivery delivers a message only when it encounters the
intended recipient. This approach saves bandwidth and buffer space. However,
this is not an optimal solution for event driven delay tolerant networks. Epidemic
on the other hand is a nave flooding approach where the message is replicated in
the network till the destination node received the message.
B.4 Running Simulations
One simulator can be run using batch mode or graphical user interface. In the
GUI mode, the location, radio range, current route and the number of messages
can be visualised. The simulation speed can be adjusted in the GUI environment.
It is possible to select a node for inspection using the event log controls. In batch
mode, the scenario name must be printed to the console and the number of
scenarios to be simulated.
B.4.1 Configuring ONE
The pre-requisite for running ONE is to have a Java jdk in your system. After
downloading and installing jdk, the java path must be set in the environmental
variables section of the system properties.
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B.5 Limitations
One of the limitations ONE simulator is the lack of lower layer support. When
two nodes are in the range of each other, they can communicate at whatever speed
is configured for connections. In real world obstacles, distance and interference
affects the achievable transmission speed. At the moment this is not taken into
consideration. The mobility models developed and used in the ONE simulator
still lack real-world details even though they are fairly complex when compared
to simple models such as random way point. Simulating a large amount of nodes
requires a lot of processing power. This uses up a lot of memory.
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